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Introduction 
Conventional wisdom holds that the world trade system evolved from a 
power-based to a rules-based regime. “To a large degree,” one of the pio-
neers of the academic study of international trade notes, “the history of 
civilization may be described as a gradual evolution from a power oriented 
approach, in the state of nature, towards a rule oriented approach.”1 In a 
steady, unidirectional process of legalization, the argument goes, trade law 
has gradually replaced trade politics.2 In particular, the creation ten years 
ago of the World Trade Organization (“WTO”)3 is commonly portrayed as 
a constitutional moment when the stability of the rule of law finally 
eclipsed the caprices of politics and diplomacy. In support of this theory, 
proponents invariably point to the WTO’s new dispute settlement mecha-
nism,4 which, unlike that of its predecessor, the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”),5 is compulsory and fully automatic.6 Com-
                                                                                                                      
 1. John H. Jackson, The Crumbling Institutions of the Liberal Trade System, 12 J. World 
Trade L. 93, 99 (1978). This quotation also appears in, inter alia, John Jackson, The World Trad-
ing System: Law and Policy of International Economic Relations 110 (2d ed. 1997). See also 
R. E. Hudec, Review Article, Free Trade, Sovereignty, Democracy: The Future of the World Trade 
Organization, 1 World Trade Rev. 211, 219–20 (2002) (“The conventional history of GATT/WTO 
dispute settlement (for which I may be partly responsible) teaches that GATT dispute settlement 
evolved from a ‘diplomatic’ instrument into a ‘judicial’ instrument.”). 
 2. See, e.g., Judith Goldstein et al., Introduction: Legalization and World Politics, 54 Int’l 
Org. 385, 389 (1982) (referring to a victory for trade “legalists” over trade “pragmatists”); Miquel 
Montañà i Mora, A GATT with Teeth: Law Wins Over Politics in the Resolution of International 
Trade Disputes, 31 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 103 (1993); Arie Reich, From Diplomacy to Law: The 
Juridicization of International Trade Relations, 17 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 775, 777 (1996–97). 
 3. Marrakesh Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 108 Stat. 
4809, 1867 U.N.T.S. 14 [hereinafter WTO Agreement]. 
 4. WTO Agreement, supra note 3, Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the 
Settlement of Disputes, Annex II, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter DSU]. 
 5. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55. U.N.T.S. 194 
[hereinafter GATT]. 
 6. Pursuant to the DSU, a defendant can no longer block the establishment of a panel or the 
adoption of panel or Appellate Body reports by the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body (“DSB”). 
DSU, supra note 4, arts. 6.1, 16.4, 17.14. 
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bined with the WTO’s expansion into a host of new regulatory areas, such 
as health and safety standards, services, trade, and intellectual property pro-
tection;7 and its single package approach (all but two of the more than thirty 
WTO agreements are binding on all 148 member countries);8 the conclusion 
that the WTO possesses a thickened legal-normative structure is, indeed, 
inescapable. The common perception is, therefore, that at the expense of 
member countries’ sovereignty (less politics), the authority of the WTO 
gradually expanded (more law).9 
Within this prevailing school of thought (from-politics-to-law) it is a 
prominent theme that for trade liberalization to occur the process must be 
unlinked from the horse-trading and instabilities of domestic politics and 
representative democracy.10 For utilitarian proponents of this idea, much the 
way we rely on experts to cure diseases, or as most countries have a 
politically independent central bank to ensure price stability, so does the 
world need a trade regime that is sealed off from the excesses of domestic 
and international politics.11 In the absence of an insulated regime, the 
argument goes, concentrated special interest groups commanding 
disproportionate leverage, in particular owners and workers in industries 
that are habitually injured by free trade, would overshadow more diffuse 
majority concerns that favor free trade, such as consumers paying less for 
imports. Since the resulting protectionism would inherently harm the 
majority, and in that sense not be democratic, WTO agreements tying the 
hands of domestic politicians to the mast of free trade “act to restrain 
protectionist interest groups, thereby promoting both free trade and 
democracy.”12 In other words, the argument concludes that, rather than a 
                                                                                                                      
 7. WTO Agreement, supra note 3, Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phyto-
sanitary Measures, Dec. 15, 1993, Annex 1A [hereinafter SPS]; WTO Agreement, supra note 3, 
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, Annex 1A [hereinafter TBT]; WTO 
Agreement, supra note 3, General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Annex 1B [here-
inafter GATS]; WTO Agreement, supra note 3, Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Annex 1C [hereinafter TRIPS]. 
 8. The plurilateral trade agreements listed in Annex 4 are binding only on members that 
have accepted them separately. WTO Agreement, supra note 3, art. 2. The listing of those agree-
ments in Annex 4 does not bind all WTO signatories. Id. 
 9. See Lori’s War, Foreign Pol’y, Spring 2000, at 29, 34–40 (interviewing Lori Wallach 
regarding perceived role of WTO); Alan Wm. Wolff, Problems with WTO Dispute Settlement, 2 Chi. 
J. Int’l L. 417, 420–21 (2001); John Ragosta et al., WTO Dispute Settlement: The System is Flawed 
and Must Be Fixed, 37 Int’l Law. 697, 698–99 (2003); see also David E. Sanger, A Blink From the 
Bush Administration, N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 2003, at A28 (touting the August 30, 2002 WTO ruling in 
the United States’ foreign sales corporations matter, and its subsequent implementation by the Bush 
administration, as the international law “equivalent of Marbury v. Madison”). 
 10. John O. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, The World Trade Constitution, 114 Harv. L. 
Rev. 511, 515–16 (2000). 
 11. The need to restrict discretionary powers of governments in furtherance of the common 
good is explained with reference to the so-called time consistency problem; that is, the inability of 
political institutions to bind themselves for future periods given their exposure to strategic behavior 
of private agents. See Finn E. Kydland & Edward C. Prescott, Rules Rather Than Discretion: The 
Inconsistency of Optimal Plans, 85 J. Pol. Econ. 473, 481 (1977). 
 12. McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 10, at 515. 
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threat to sovereignty and representative government, the WTO is a 
fundamental and inherent guarantor of democracy.13 Others base a similar 
approach not on utilitarian, welfare-maximization calculations, but on 
constitutional theory. Just as most countries have human rights and 
constitutional guarantees to protect against political dictatorship by the 
majority, so does the world require economic freedoms of a constitutional 
nature to protect citizens against economic abuse or failure of representative 
government.14 From both this utilitarian and from the constitutional 
perspective, the commonly perceived trajectory of world trade from politics 
to law is, therefore, not simply a historical observation. It is a prescriptive, 
normative goal. 
This Article contests the traditional view of the evolution of the world 
trade system. Rather than a unidirectional process of legalization focused 
exclusively on the system’s normative structure, Part I of the Article, “The 
Explosion of the GATT Club,” recounts the transformation from GATT to 
WTO as a bidirectional interaction between law and politics; in particular, 
between the system’s legal-normative structure and its political, decision-
making branch. Legal change in the world trade system has, indeed, been 
profound. Yet, it could only happen and is best understood in its interaction 
with the system’s political process. My claim is that this law-and-politics 
narrative, as opposed to the conventional from-politics-to-law story, better 
explains the evolution of the world trade system. It better explains, in par-
ticular, how countries could ever agree to decisionmaking by simple 
majority in the original GATT, what reassured them to surrender their veto 
right in the WTO dispute process, and why today WTO members so vehe-
mently defend the consensus rule for political decisions. 
To tell this alternative story the Article borrows from the theoretical 
framework of exit and voice, introduced in 1970 by the economist Albert 
Hirschman15 and later brilliantly applied by Joseph Weiler to the transforma-
tion of the European Community (“E.C.”).16 Crudely put, following 
Hirschman’s insight, there is an inverse, bidirectional relation between exit 
and voice. In the context of this Article, slightly bending and extending 
                                                                                                                      
 13. Id.; see also Robert E. Hudec, “Circumventing” Democracy: The Political Morality of 
Trade Negotiations, 25 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 311 (1993). Rather than focusing on domestic 
consumers, however, Hudec highlights the major benefits of trade from the viewpoint of domestic 
exporters and foreign producers. Id at 314. 
 14. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Constitutional Functions and Constitutional 
Problems of International Economic Law 387–92 (1991). 
 15. Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty (1970). In Hirschman’s opinion, 
when faced with dysfunctional behavior by or in an organization (be it a firm, tribe, government, or 
international organization), that is, a deterioration in the organization’s performance, two endoge-
nous forces of recovery are possible. Firstly, the client of the firm or member of the institution can 
leave the organization (e.g., buy her goods elsewhere), which ought to put pressure on the organiza-
tion to improve (the exit option). Id. at 21. Secondly, the client of the firm or member of the 
institution can protest or complain to the management of the organization pushing it to improve its 
goods or services (the voice option). Id. at 30. 
 16. J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 Yale L.J. 2403, 2410–12 (1991), 
reprinted and updated in J.H.H. Weiler, The Constitution of Europe (1999), 10–101. 
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Hirschman’s concepts, “exit” is characterized by the lack of law or disci-
pline or the thickness of a system’s legal-normative structure, which offers 
easy options to defect from the cooperative regime. Similarly, “voice” is 
characterized by the broader notions of politics, participation, or levels of 
contestation in the political decisionmaking process, such as offering abun-
dant opportunities for expressing preferences for cooperative decisions. 
Closure of exit options (more law or discipline) leads to higher demands for 
voice (more politics or participation). Conversely, higher levels of voice 
(more politics) are an absolute requirement for enabling and sustaining the 
closure of exit (more law). 
Through this lens, my claim is that the world trade system evolved from 
a combination of high exit and low voice in the text of GATT 1947 to a 
combination of low exit and high voice in the WTO. That is, it evolved from 
low discipline or law, with many escape clauses and weak enforcement, and 
low participation or politics, with a highly technical and technocratic opera-
tion run by simple majority vote, to high discipline or law (stricter rules and 
automatic enforcement) and relatively high participation or politics, a glob-
ally contested organization strictly run by consensus. One major 
consequence of this claim is that increased legalization or discipline such as 
more supervision by the WTO and less exit, must not come at the expense of 
less politics in the form of less voice from member countries and their con-
stituencies. Rather, more discipline and harder law (less exit) lead to and 
require more politics and higher levels of participation (more voice). Hence, 
both the WTO and its member states were strengthened. Most importantly, 
the WTO holds a stronger enforcement mechanism and the states retain a 
veto in the political process. Another crucial insight of this claim is that the 
often referred-to “institutional paradox” between the WTO’s consensus-
based, inefficient rulemaking procedures and its highly efficient, automatic 
dispute settlement system is readily explained.17 Rather than a paradox or 
puzzle, the juxtaposition of a strong, automatic dispute settlement system 
(high discipline, low exit) and a tedious, consensus-based rulemaking proc-
ess (high voice/participation) is a logical—although not necessarily 
optimal—phenomenon. High levels of legalization and discipline, such as a 
strong enforcement mechanism, entail limited exit options and naturally 
require and lead to high demands for voice via participation and political 
input, such as consensus decisionmaking. 
Moving from the descriptive and analytical to the normative, Part II of 
this Article, “The Threat of a WTO Fortress,” challenges the view that a 
                                                                                                                      
 17. I. Garcia Bercero, Functioning of the WTO System: Elements for Possible Institutional 
Reform, 6 Int’l Trade L. & Reg. 103, 105 (2000); see also Claude Barfield, Free Trade, 
Sovereignty, Democracy: The Future of the World Trade Organization 1 (2001); Claus-
Dieter Ehlermann, Tensions between the Dispute Settlement Process and the Diplomatic and Treaty-
Making Activities of the WTO, 1 World Trade Rev. 301, 305 (2002); John H. Jackson, The WTO 
“Constitution” and Proposed Reforms: Seven “Mantras” Revisited, 4 J. Int’l Econ. L. 67, 77 
(2001); Frieder Roessler, The Institutional Balance between the Judicial and the Political Organs of 
the WTO, in New Directions in International Economic Law: Essays in Honour of John H. 
Jackson, 325, 338 (Marco Bronckers & Reinhard Quick eds., 2000). 
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choice must be made between politics and law or, put differently, between, 
on the one hand, democratic representation, participation, contestation, and 
the inherent flexibility that comes with it and, on the other hand, discipline, 
precommitment, and some degree of government by experts or export-
driven interests shielded from capture and popular ignorance. On the con-
trary, my claim is that a legitimate and efficient trading system requires both 
politics and law, or more particularly, appropriate balances between partici-
pation and discipline, flexibility and precommitment, accountability and 
insulation, popular support and expertise, and input and output legitimacy. 
At the time of writing, however, the world trade system is out of bal-
ance. Over the years it gradually moved beyond the technicalities of import 
duties to cover more politically sensitive areas such as health regulation and 
intellectual property. Now that it matters, in that it affects not just traders but 
everyone in society, and its disciplines and law have become real because 
WTO rules became stricter and more strictly enforced, the WTO has been 
unable to meet the correspondingly high demands for participation, ac-
countability, and contestation. In large part because of its foundational 
mechanics (overcoming protectionism by insulating export-interests from 
domestic politics) the world trade system remains too technocratic and too 
isolated from popular support and has, in places, become too rigid or legal-
ized to respond to valid flexibility demands of representative politics. In 
sum, there is not enough participation or politics to sustain the high levels of 
discipline or law. Put differently, the WTO suffers from a lack of popular 
support, loyalty, and input legitimacy to continue its highly disciplined and 
legalized operation. 
Yet, at the same time, unlike the early years of GATT, this lack of input 
legitimacy is no longer offset by progress in actual trade liberalization or 
output legitimacy. The increase in participation or politics that did take place 
since GATT’s creation, in particular the insistence by countries on a political 
veto and decisionmaking by consensus, is currently stifling further welfare-
enhancing liberalization and preventing much needed reforms to make the 
system more equitable for developing countries and more open and sup-
ported by civil society. As a result, the WTO now lives in what one could 
call the worst of both worlds: it misses the benefits of popular support or 
politics (lack of input legitimacy) and must do without the benefits of fur-
ther trade liberalization and a rule of law perceived as fair and equitable for 
everyone (lack of output legitimacy). 
The most common proposals to reform the WTO, including the January 
2005 Sutherland Report on the future of the WTO,18 do not take account of 
this delicate interaction and balance between law and politics. They focus 
rather on just one side of the spectrum without weighing the countervailing 
                                                                                                                      
 18. Peter Sutherland et al., Report by the Consultative Board to the Director-
General Supachai Panitchpakdi, The Future of the WTO: Addressing Institutional 
Challenges in the New Millennium (2004) [hereinafter Sutherland Report]. 
PAUWELLYN REDO.DOC 9/20/2005 9:12 AM 
October 2005] The Transformation of World Trade 7 
 
effects on the other.19 This Article examines in particular the following three 
proposals: (1) further legalize or depoliticize the WTO with, for example, 
legal standing for private parties and fewer escape clauses;20 (2) facilitate 
decisionmaking in the WTO political process through, for example, majority 
voting or executive bodies;21 and (3) reintroduce politics into the WTO judi-
cial branch with, for example, political vetoes against dispute rulings.22 
Knowing that the present combination is one of high discipline that led 
to and requires high levels of participation, my claim is that, when imple-
mented in isolation, all three proposals are counterintuitive. First, further 
legalization, without the necessary political support, would put even more 
pressure on the voice mechanism and demand even higher levels of partici-
pation in an organization where such levels are already too low. It would 
only worsen the deadlock in the political branch and risk being counterpro-
ductive by putting pressure on some members, particularly the most 
powerful ones, to leave the organization. Second, although majority voting 
could facilitate the decisionmaking process and thus, like further legaliza-
tion, boost the WTO’s short-term output legitimacy, the limitation in voice 
and participation that it would engender through members losing their veto 
over new rules risks undermining the support for, and legitimacy of, both the 
strong dispute process and, in the long run, the trade system as a whole. In 
the absence of a high enough level of “loyalty,” Hirschman’s third notion 
besides exit and voice,23 or support for the WTO, more—not less—voice or 
participation from individual WTO members and their constituencies is 
needed. Third, reverting to GATT, diplomatic-style dispute settlement, re-
injecting politics into the dispute process itself, may entangle decisionmak-
ing deadlocks. Less discipline would, indeed, require less participation. Yet, 
this proposal neglects almost 100 years of trade history. If the inter-war pe-
riod and GATT have taught us one lesson it is that for actual trade 
liberalization to occur, trade commitments must have legal value and be 
backed by a strong, independent dispute mechanism. This is all the more 
necessary today, when most trade restrictions take the form of covert nontar-
iff barriers, often going to the heart of state sovereignty, for which countries 
would be hard-pressed to exercise a veto if they had one. 
                                                                                                                      
 19. For notable exceptions, see Robert Hudec, The GATT Legal System and World 
Trade Diplomacy (2d ed. 1990) [hereinafter Hudec, Diplomacy], and more recently, Armin von 
Bogdandy, Law and Politics in the WTO—Strategies to Cope with a Deficient Relationship, in 5 
Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations L. 609 (Jochen A. Frowein & Rüdiger Wolfrum eds., 
2001), and Richard H. Steinberg, Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, Constitutional, and 
Political Constraints, 98 Am. J. Int’l L. 247 (2004). 
 20. See, e.g., Petersmann, supra note 14, at 459–62; John A. Ragosta, Unmasking the 
WTO—Access to the DSB System: Can the WTO DSB Live Up to the Moniker “World Trade 
Court”?, 31 L. & Pol’y Int’l Bus. 739, 741 (2000). 
 21. See, e.g., Thomas Cottier & Satoko Takenoshita, The Balance of Power in WTO Deci-
sion-Making: Towards Weighted Voting in Legislative Response, 58 Aussenwirtschaft 171, 184–
86 (2003). 
 22. Barfield, supra note 17, at 7. 
 23. See Hirschman, supra note 15, at 76–105 
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Rather than portraying constitutionalization or detachment from politics 
as the system’s normative goal as the utilitarian and constitutional schools 
described earlier,24 this Article stresses the usefulness and need for politics, 
participation, flexibility, and occasional crisis. Equally, instead of advocat-
ing a wholesale reintroduction of representative politics in the world trade 
system as both conservative sovereigntists25 and left-leaning cosmopolitans 
tend to do,26 this Article accepts the need for precommitment and discipline 
to tame the protectionist excesses of representative democracy. Without such 
hand-tying, the WTO would soon be ineffective and fail to fulfill its cru-
cially important mandate of welfare-enhancing trade liberalization. Hence, 
as much as law needs politics, so politics needs law. The difference between 
these two, in my view, flawed extremes, focused, respectively, on ”just more 
law” or “just more politics” is, however, that discipline or legalization with-
out sufficient politics or accountability risks an unsupported and 
unsustainable system that in the meantime imposes its whim on the people 
in the name of economic efficiency: efficiency without loyalty. In contrast, 
politics, participation, and flexibility without sufficient discipline or pre-
commitment would lead to an inefficient, even inactive, trade regime in 
which important gains from trade are foregone: loyalty without efficiency. 
As an alternative to such reform proposals, focusing exclusively on ei-
ther law or politics, discipline or participation, this Article pleads for a more 
comprehensive reform package that takes account of both the law and poli-
tics poles. On the law or discipline side, my claim is that rather than 
embracing ever more legalization, the WTO needs to maintain a certain 
level of flexibility or exit options, especially those fine-tuned to consumer 
welfare and democratic politics. In particular, it must move away from the 
single-package orthodoxy and permit differentiation through a multiple-
speed WTO. In addition, the system must continue to provide for broad sub-
stantive exceptions, meaningful safeguard mechanisms, waivers, tariff and 
other re-negotiations, temporary compensation or suspension in the event of 
noncompliance, and the scope to settle disputes—and regulate trade-related 
questions in other international fora—in deviation from WTO rules for as 
long as third-party rights are left untouched. Rather than being birth defects 
that need to be cured through gradual legalization, these flexibility and exit 
options, including the application of WTO law in the wider context of inter-
national law, must be clarified and maintained. 
On the politics or participation side, the Article rejects the relatively 
easy way out of decisionmaking by executive bodies or qualified majorities. 
Instead, at this point in time, the WTO needs the high levels of voice, par-
ticipation, and contestation linked to the consensus principle. Although the 
WTO’s decisionmaking practice is messy, takes time, and can be made more 
                                                                                                                      
 24. See McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 10; Petersmann, supra note 14. 
 25. See, e.g., Barfield, supra note 17. 
 26. See id.; Lori’s War, supra note 9; see also Robert Howse, From Politics to Technocracy—
and Back Again: The Fate of the Multilateral Trading Regime, 96 Am. J. Int’l L. 94 (2002). 
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inclusive, the benefits linked to consensus—not to be confused with una-
nimity—outweigh its costs. More importantly, if the WTO is to survive as a 
legitimate institution that effectively liberalizes trade it will need the partici-
pation, loyalty, and support, not just of governmental trade elites and 
technocrats but also of consumers and citizens at large. In addition, it must 
engage in the muddy process of coordination and contestation with, and 
among, other international treaty regimes set up to correct market failures or 
accompany free trade with social and other noneconomic safety nets. Be-
sides procedural reforms that enhance the transparency of, and access to, the 
WTO, such loyalty and support through participation and contestation re-
quires a substantive shift in the trade system’s paradigm, mechanics, and 
rules and exceptions, away from the proxy of export-driven, producer inter-
ests with allegedly only majority concerns in mind, and more directly 
aligned with consumer and citizen interests in both poor and rich countries 
for whose benefit the world trade system was set up in the first place. 
I do realize that the combination of maintaining politically responsive 
flexibility or exit options and increasing levels of voice or participation by 
both governments and their peoples, including that required for new agree-
ments, implies that global economic integration may not always be optimal. 
It will make progress toward further liberalization messy, slow, and difficult 
to achieve and will face the occasional political deadlock. My claim is, how-
ever, that this lethargy—or, to use a term common in European law, 
lourdeur—is the price to pay for the long-term survival and legitimacy of the 
world trade system. Moreover, the subtle combination of more participation 
and limited but clearly defined exit options in the background ought to fa-
cilitate political agreement. Given the ex post flexibility, countries will be 
less nervous to engage in new rules. In turn, when rules are agreed to with 
higher levels of participation and support, they are more likely to be com-
plied with and resort to the exit options enshrined in the system ought to be 
exceptional. As a result, limited exit options may actually reinforce rather 
than undermine the system’s credibility. 
I. The Explosion of the GATT Club 
Part I of this Article tells the alternative story of the transformation of 
the world trade system as a bidirectional interaction between law and poli-
tics in lieu of the conventional from-politics-to-law narrative focused 
exclusively on the trade system’s dispute settlement branch. It describes 
three distinct periods: (i) the original creation of GATT in 1947 (“The Poli-
tics of a Gentlemen’s Club”), (ii) the GATT in operation between 1947 and 
1994 (“GATT’s Quiet Mutation”), and (iii) the creation of the WTO and its 
first ten years of operation (“The WTO Eruption”). 
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A. GATT 1947: The Politics of a Gentlemen’s Club 
1. Why Was a World Trade Regime Needed in the First Place? 
“If economists ruled the world,” Paul Krugman notes, “there would be 
no need for a World Trade Organization.”27 Following standard economics, 
free trade maximizes national welfare. Therefore, rational governments 
ought to liberalize trade unilaterally, without the need for an international 
regime. The reality, of course, is different. Governments face both economic 
and political incentives to restrict trade, and international coordination was 
needed to effect its liberalization. 
One school of thought, the terms-of-trade school, focuses on economic 
incentives.28 In economic terms, they argue, large countries—that is, those 
big enough to influence world prices—are tempted to increase their terms of 
trade (i.e., reduce import prices) and thereby enhance national welfare 
through the imposition of a so-called optimal tariff rate. Doing so harms 
foreign exporters. However, since foreigners do not vote, governments are 
unlikely to factor in those externalities. At the same time, if all nations im-
pose such an optimal tariff—be it unilaterally or to retaliate against the tariff 
of another nation—most gains of trade are neutralized and all countries are 
likely to be worse off compared to a situation without tariffs.29 This puts 
countries in something like a large-scale prisoner’s dilemma. For the terms-
of-trade school, the creation of GATT is explained as a way out of this di-
lemma. Through the exchange of reciprocal “concessions” of market 
access—originally tariff reductions—countries steered away from so-called 
beggar-thy-neighbor policies making everyone worse off. Instead, reciprocal 
commitments to liberalize trade, backed up by the threat of retaliation in the 
event of defection, forces countries to take account of the harm they cause to 
others. As a result, GATT ensures a win-win situation for all sides. 
A second school of thought focuses on political incentives to restrict 
trade.30 It relies on public choice and constitutional theories to explain the 
                                                                                                                      
 27. Paul Krugman, What Should Trade Negotiators Negotiate About?, 35 J. Econ. Litera-
ture 113, 113 (1997). 
 28. See Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, The Economics of the World Trading 
System (2002); Harry G. Johnson, Optimum Tariffs and Retaliation, 21 Rev. Econ. Stud. 142 
(1954); Raymond Riezman, Tariff Retaliation from a Strategic Viewpoint, 48 S. Econ. J. 583 (1982) 
(modeling the tariff game as a prisoner’s dilemma); Edward Tower, The Optimum Quota and Re-
taliation, 42 Rev. Econ. Stud. 623 (1975) (analyzing quota instead of tariff retaliation). 
 29. A large country could be better off by imposing a tariff even in the case of foreign re-
taliation as long as its price elasticity of import demand is larger than the corresponding elasticity of 
its trading partners. Johnson, supra note 28, at 144. 
 30. Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, Interest Groups and Trade Policy 111 
(2002); J. Michael Finger, Protectionist Rules and Internationalist Discretion in the Making of 
National Trade Policy, in New Institutional Arrangements for the World Economy 310 
(Hans-Jürgen Vosgerau ed., 1989); Wilfred J. Ethier, Political Externalities, Nondiscrimi-
nation, and a Multilateral World 4 (Penn Institute for Economic Research, Working Paper 
No. 02-030, 2002), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=333006; Wilfred J. Ethier, Trade 
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creation of GATT. The benefits of free trade are long-term, diffuse, and 
fragmented across consumers, while its costs, although mostly smaller, are 
felt immediately and directly in layers of society that are best organized, 
such as import-competing industries and organized labor. Because of collec-
tive action problems, the supporters of free trade, such as consumers, have 
less incentive to incur the cost of lobbying. Those suffering from liberaliza-
tion, in contrast, are geographically concentrated. Their contributions to the 
industry’s cause are more readily mobilized and monitored. As a result, pro-
tectionist groups wield more political clout. Consequently, governments face 
pressures to restrict trade that, more often than not, outweigh those in sup-
port of free trade. International coordination, that is, the exchange of 
reciprocal “concessions” of market access, is then explained as adding the 
weight of exporters to the less-organized domestic free-trade camp of con-
sumers in order to overcome the disproportionate impact of protectionist 
groups (import-competing industries and labor).31 For the constitutional 
branch of this school of thought, trade agreements fulfill a true constitu-
tional function, namely the protection of economic liberties and majority 
interests against government interference and abuse by special-interest 
groups.32 
A third perspective focuses on the discriminatory nature of pre-GATT 
trade relations largely determined by colonial preferences and overlapping 
bilateral trade agreements.33 Rather than pursuing the internalization of 
cross-border externalities (the terms-of-trade school) or the maximization of 
national, consumer welfare against abuse by protectionist minorities (public 
choice and constitutional schools), in this third view the GATT emerged to 
deal with “the mess of the existing bilateral and discriminatory trade  
policies.”34 In support of this approach, it is pointed out that, to this date, the 
                                                                                                                      
Agreements Based on Political Externalities 7 (Penn Institute for Economic Research, Work-
ing Paper 03-035, 2002), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=474562. 
 31. See McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 10, at 526–30. 
 32. Petersmann, supra note 14, at 132–33; Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Trade Policy as a 
Constitutional Problem, 41 Aussenwirtschaft 405 (1986); Jan Tumlir, Conceptions of the Inter-
national Economic and Legal Order, 8 World Econ. 85, 87 (1985) (reviewing John H. Jackson 
et al., Implementing the Tokyo Round: National Constitutions and International  
Economic Rules (1984)); Jan Tumlir, International Economic Order and Democratic Constitu-
tionalism, 34 ORDO 71, 82–83 (1983).  
 33. Between 1934 and 1945 the United States, for example, negotiated and accepted thirty-
two so-called reciprocal trade agreements. John H. Jackson, World Trade and the Law of 
GATT: A Legal Analysis of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 37 (1969). Espe-
cially for the United States, the GATT was more efficient than endless bilateral agreements—in 
addition, GATT was the United States’ only institutional option under which to achieve its trade 
objectives given that the United States, unlike other major trading nations (France, Britain, etc.), had 
no regional alternative and could not count on existing imperial or regional trade ties. John Odell & 
Barry Eichengreen, The United States, the ITO, and the WTO: Exit Options, Agent Slack, and Presi-
dential Leadership, in The WTO as an International Organization 181, 183 (Anne O. 
Krueger ed., 1998). 
 34. Patrick A. Messerlin, Non-discrimination, Welfare Balances and WTO Rules: An Histori-
cal Perspective, in Preparing the Doha Development Round: Challenges to the 
Legitimacy and Efficiency of the World Trading System 154, 156 (Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann 
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world trade system remains focused on non-discrimination as opposed to 
economic efficiency and the protection of producer as opposed to consumer 
welfare.35 From this perspective, the system neither avoids harmful cross-
border externalities nor does it inherently protect domestic consumers. In-
stead of inherently protecting the majority, the trade system, thereby, risks 
elevating special (producer) interests above consumer concerns and beyond 
the control of domestic politics.36 
2. The Original GATT Bargain: It’s All Politics 
Whatever the underlying theory of why a multilateral trade system was, 
and remains, needed, the immediate context of GATT’s creation in 1947 was 
the jolt of the Great Depression and World War II.37 The conclusion of 
GATT constituted a major departure from previous forms of trade coopera-
tion. Ever since the creation of the League of Nations after World War I, 
international conferences had been convened to address deteriorating trade 
conditions,38 but the world needed the wake-up call of another world war to 
move beyond the lofty rhetoric of hortatory declarations and agree to more 
specific commitments that would be supported by a normative structure. 
Whilst GATT did inaugurate the creation of a legal-normative regime for 
world trade, at its core it remained a profoundly political bargain. Although 
GATT negotiators realized that some degree of normative pull was needed, 
if only to avoid the mistakes of the past, they also voiced a strong distrust of 
lawyers and the rigid legal method, which, in their minds, would not enable 
flexible responses to real trade problems.39 As a result, what kept GATT to-
                                                                                                                      
ed., 2003), available at http://www.iue.it/RSCAS/e-texts/200405_e-WTO-Petersmann.pdf. Interest-
ingly, as Messerlin points out, when GATT was created in 1947 the notions of producer and 
consumer welfare remained underdeveloped. It is, therefore, hard to conclude that the GATT was 
based on economic analysis. Id. at 155 (“If the key economic concepts were largely discovered by 
the late 1800s and formalized by the 1930s, their operational form, that is, their capacity to answer 
questions raised by decision makers in a straight forward and computable manner, was non-
existent.” (citation omitted)). 
 35. See Henrik Horn & Petros C. Mavroidis, Economic and Legal Aspects of the Most-
Favored Nation Clause, 17 Eur. J. Pol. Econ. 233, 234–36 (2001); Petros C. Mavroidis, Come 
Together? Producer Welfare, Consumer Welfare and WTO Rules, in Preparing the Doha Devel-
opment Round: Challenges to the Legitimacy and Efficiency of the World Trading 
Form, supra note 34, at 137. 
 36. Eyal Benvenisti, Exit and Voice in the Age of Globalization, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 167 
(1999). 
 37. World War I shook the very foundations of economic liberalism and destroyed the econ-
omy of Europe. See Clair Wilcox, A Charter for World Trade 5–9 (1949). In the interwar 
period (the Great Depression), a major wave of protectionism swept across the globe. One after the 
other, in a cascade of retaliatory action, countries imposed quantitative restrictions and prohibitively 
high tariffs on imports and manipulated their exchange rates. These “beggar-thy-neighbor” policies, 
rather than achieving their purpose of increased competitiveness and lower unemployment rates, 
caused economic chaos and, according to many observers, were responsible to some degree for 
World War II itself. See Richard N. Gardner, Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy 1–4 (1956). 
 38. Hudec, Diplomacy, supra note 19, at 5–9. 
 39. See id. at 25–26 (quoting from a 1932 report of the League of Nations’ Economic Com-
mittee, calling for a nonjudicial procedure to resolve economic disputes); id. at 29 (quoting a U.K. 
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gether was not so much an abstract respect for legal rules, but rather the po-
litical and economic need to keep intact a negotiated balance of tariff 
concessions, originally exchanged in 1947 and subsequently expanded in 
further rounds of trade negotiations. Reciprocal tariff reductions through 
Part I of GATT were at the apex of this GATT bargain. This tariff deal was, 
in turn, supported by the standard trade policy rules set out in Part II, such 
as national treatment and prohibitions on quantitative restrictions. Part II 
was crucial to ensure that commercial opportunities offered by tariff reduc-
tions would not be nullified by trade policy instruments other than tariffs. 
No strong enforcement mechanism to keep this balance afloat was needed. 
After all, the balance was struck because of reciprocal gains reaped from 
exchanging tariff reductions. This balance was, in turn, kept because of the 
threat of reciprocal withdrawals of concessions in case a country would not 
meet its end of the bargain. This was the secret of the GATT’s early success. 
The original GATT was, therefore, more like a gentlemen’s club than a 
legal regime. Its objective was to settle trade problems, not to create or clar-
ify trade law. Flexibility to adapt to economic and political realities 
prevailed over the predictability of the rule of law. The GATT club was in-
spired and run by what became known as “embedded liberalism,” that is, a 
common belief amongst the technocratic elites of the original twenty-three 
GATT contracting parties—after all, a limited set of like-minded, capitalist 
countries—that trade liberalization increases welfare and requires interna-
tional coordination and discipline, albeit with sufficient room left for 
domestic politics to redistribute income and sustain the safety-nets of the 
welfare state at home.40 
In this clublike context, it should come as no surprise that in the text of 
GATT the equilibrium reached between law and politics, discipline and par-
ticipation, exit and voice, was one of relatively low levels of politics or 
participation combined with equally low levels of law or discipline. 
a. Low Levels of Discipline and Law. The original GATT maintained 
multiple escape routes and safeguard mechanisms for countries seeking to 
avoid GATT basic principles. First, the GATT included broadly defined sub-
stantive exceptions: Article XII permitted trade restrictions to safeguard a 
country’s balance of payments, Article XVIII allowed for governmental as-
sistance to economic development, and Articles XX and XXI provided for a 
broad range of general exceptions ranging from public morals and health to 
the protection of national security, historic treasures, and natural exhaustible 
resources. Second, and more importantly, GATT also permitted trade restric-
tions without the need to base them on specific non-protectionist concerns 
as is required under most substantive exceptions. Article XIX introduced so-
called safeguard measures that permit the reinstatement of trade restrictions 
                                                                                                                      
memorandum submitted to the London drafting session of the ITO Charter in 1946, insisting on the 
importance of economic judgment). 
 40. Howse, supra note 26, at 96–98; John Gerard Ruggie, International Regimes, Transac-
tions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order, 36 Int’l Org. 379, 393–
98 (1982). 
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when countries are faced with a sudden influx of imports causing serious 
injury to their domestic industry. Article VI permitted extra tariffs to offset 
so-called dumping, that is, exports sold at less than the normal value of the 
products concerned. Article XXVIII set out different procedures for parties 
to renegotiate tariff concessions, for whatever reason, on condition that they 
offer equivalent liberalization in other products or suffer reciprocal suspen-
sions by other parties. In addition, under Article XXV:5, GATT parties 
acting jointly and by two-thirds of votes cast could, in exceptional circum-
stances, grant a waiver from any GATT obligation. Finally, the so-called 
“existing legislation clause” in the GATT’s Protocol of Provisional Applica-
tion, in force until the creation of the WTO in 1995, grandfathered pre-1947 
legislation under Part II of GATT.41 
In the same vein, GATT’s enforcement mechanism (Article XXIII) was 
a diplomatic procedure set up to maintain a balance of concessions in the 
face of future uncertainties,42 not an independent judicial system to ensure 
the impartial enforcement of GATT rules.43 As a result, instead of tackling 
breaches of international law obligations, the GATT dispute process focused 
on the “nullification or impairment” of GATT benefits. By the same token, 
the GATT’s remedy of last resort was to “suspend concessions or other obli-
gations.”44 The resulting enforcement regime was therefore distinctly un-
legal and, somewhat paradoxically, both lenient and strict. On the one hand, 
the system was lenient: the customary consequences linked to a breach of an 
international law obligation—in legal terms, cessation and reparation, and in 
political terms, the reputational costs of breaking the law—were avoided. 
On the other hand, however, the system was uniquely strict: parties were 
held “responsible” not only for breaches of GATT obligations, but also for 
“nullification or impairment” caused by conduct that did not conflict with 
any specific GATT provision under so-called non-violation or situation 
complaints.45 Finally, confirming the relatively low levels of discipline or 
                                                                                                                      
 41. Protocol of Provisional Application of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 
30, 1947, 61 Stat. 2051, 55 U.N.T.S. 308, para. 1(b). 
 42. As one draftsman put it: “ ‘We shall achieve . . . if our negotiations are successful, a 
careful balance of the interests of the contracting parties. This balance rests upon certain assump-
tions as to the character of the underlying situation in the years to come. And it involves a mutuality 
of obligations and benefits. If, with the passage of time, the underlying situation should change or 
the benefits accorded any Member should be impaired, the balance would be destroyed. It is the 
purpose of [GATT] Article XXIII to restore this balance.’ ” Note by the Secretariat, Non-Violation 
Complaints under GATT Article XXIII:2, at 6, U.N. Doc. MTN.GNG/NG13/W/31 (Jul. 14, 1989), 
available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/history/urdsu/w31.pdf, quoting U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/A/ 
PV/6, at 5 (1947). 
 43. Joost Pauwelyn, Enforcement and Countermeasures in the WTO: Rules are Rules—
Toward a More Collective Approach, 94 Am. J. Int’l L. 335, 339–40 (2000). 
 44. GATT, supra note 5, art. XXIII:2. 
 45. Id. art. XXIII:1(b), (c). Since it was realized that domestic measures, such as subsidies or 
product safety standards, that did not directly relate to trade policy could affect the benefits from 
tariff reductions and it would be impossible to catalogue all such possibilities (as well as politically 
unfeasible for countries to severely circumscribe their domestic powers in this respect in a mere 
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constraint, withdrawal from GATT was easy. It sufficed to give sixty days 
notice.46 
b. Low Levels of Participation and Politics. If the original GATT re-
flected low levels of discipline and law, on the politics or voice axis it built 
upon equally low levels of participation and approval. GATT was, and was 
seen as, a highly technical, tariff-focused operation driven and inspired by 
an expert-consensus on embedded liberalism. Far from being the result of 
democratic politics, one of the GATT’s core objectives was to curtail the 
excesses of representative democracy and the logrolling and protectionism 
that came with it. Confirming the distance between Geneva-based negotia-
tors and the people they represented, the U.S. Congress, like many other 
parliaments, never even ratified the GATT agreement. Technically speaking, 
it was only provisionally applied and never formally entered into force until 
the creation of the WTO forty-seven years later.47 
In addition, when it came to making new rules or amendments, equally 
low levels of approval and participation were seen as adequate. Pursuant to 
GATT Article XXV, broad competences were delegated to GATT contract-
ing parties acting jointly, including to meet and decide “with a view to 
facilitating the operation and furthering the objectives of [GATT].”48 Even 
more surprising, unless explicitly provided otherwise, these competences 
could be exercised by a simple majority of the votes cast,49 with each  
contracting party entitled to only one vote and no GATT party entitled to 
veto power.50 Joint action under GATT Article XXV, albeit taken by the 
                                                                                                                      
tariff agreement), the remedy of nonviolation and situation complaints was added as a final check to 
uphold the GATT bargain. See Hudec, Diplomacy, supra note 19, at 23–24. 
 46. GATT art. XXXI refers to six months. Paragraph 5 of the Protocol of Provisional 
Application (which made and kept GATT operational for forty-seven years until the WTO was 
created), however, reduced this period to sixty days. Hence, as Jackson noted, “if a nation objected 
strenuously enough to a decision of the CONTRACTING PARTIES, it could simply withdraw if it 
felt the balance of the advantages obtained through GATT were not sufficient to offset the 
disadvantages of the particular decision.” Jackson, supra note 33, at 127. 
 47. As is well documented, the 1948 Havana Charter, which was supposed to establish a new 
International Trade Organization (“ITO”)—as well as its 1955 spin-off, the Organization for Trade 
Cooperation (“OTC”)—never came about. See Gardner, supra note 37. On several occasions the 
United States Congress refused ratification. As a result, the GATT was provisionally applied (never 
actually entering into force) for forty-seven years until, finally, in 1995 the WTO saw the light of 
day. 
 48. GATT, supra note 5, art. XXV. As Frieder Roessler, former GATT legal advisor, noted: 
“The Contracting Parties were given the right to meet with a view to furthering the objectives of the 
General Agreement to enable them to respond to future, possibly unforeseen, changes. . . . What is 
decisive is whether in the current circumstances the discussions of the subject-matter furthers the 
objectives of the General Agreement.” Frieder Roessler, The Competence of GATT, J. World Trade 
L., June 1987, at 73, 76 (1987). In similar fashion, article 235 grants broad powers to the Commu-
nity, in particular the Council, to take “action . . . necessary to attain . . . one of the objectives of the 
Community.” Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Jan. 22, 1972, art. 235, 1377 
U.N.T.S. 12 [hereinafter EEC Treaty]. 
 49. GATT, supra note 5, art. XXV:4. 
 50. GATT, supra note 5, art. XXV:3. Since the rules of procedure set the quorum for valid 
decisionmaking at a simple majority of contracting parties, Rules of Procedure for Sessions of the 
Contracting Parties, GATT. B.I.S.D. (12th Supp.) at 9, 13 (1964), in theory, joint action under  
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slightest majority, was binding on all parties, even those who voted against 
the particular decision.51 Crucially, in the original GATT, the enforcement 
mechanism also was subject to the decisionmaking rule of Article XXV. The 
mechanism was set up as a diplomatic process to be run jointly by all GATT 
parties, not by independent dispute panels. Complaints, investigations, and 
eventual recommendations were, therefore, to be initiated, conducted, and 
adopted by simple majority of the votes cast. Based on Article XXV, a sin-
gle defendant could not block the dispute process. 
Finally, GATT amendment procedures permitted equally low levels of 
participation. Most GATT rules could be changed by a two-thirds majority 
of the parties. Although any amendment bound only those GATT parties that 
accepted it, GATT parties could thus be outvoted on an amendment. Whilst 
in line with the general principle of state consent, this did permit normative 
differentiation between countries or a multiple-speed GATT.52 
3. GATT 1947 as a Bidirectional Interaction 
Between Law and Politics 
The previous Section demonstrates that the original GATT bargain com-
bined relatively low levels of discipline or precommitment, e.g. multiple 
escape clauses and a largely political enforcement procedure, with relatively 
low levels of politics or participation, e.g. lack of formal ratification and 
joint action by majority vote. One way to explain this early balance is self-
referential, pointing to the internal history or logic of either the law or poli-
tics pole. For example, as hinted at earlier, GATT law was probably soft 
because of a general aversion amongst negotiators of strict legalism, the 
clublike atmosphere of the early GATT days, and the prevailing idea of em-
bedded liberalism that permitted flexibility and room for domestic 
maneuvering. That GATT decisionmaking, in turn, required relatively low 
levels of politics or participation such as that required by a simple majority 
could also be explained internally within the politics or voice pole. Tariff 
negotiations, the central part of the GATT, are a highly technical, low poli-
tics exercise more easily left to experts. Those experts, in turn, were quite 
content to operate in a businesslike fashion, estranged from politics and 
amenable to rapid reactions in changed circumstances. As a result, they were 
                                                                                                                      
Article XXV could be taken by one-fourth of the membership (that is, even if only half of the mem-
bership is present, half of those present and casting a vote can still adopt decisions). 
 51. Cf. EEC Treaty, supra note 48, art. 235 (requiring unanimity). As John Jackson noted in 
1969: “[L]ooking at the language of [GATT Article XXV] . . . without considering preparatory 
history, practice, or circumstances, one might conclude that sweeping obligations concerning trade 
could be entered into by a majority of the contracting parties and be made binding upon other mem-
bers, even those not voting for the proposal.” Jackson, supra note 33, at 127. 
 52. Note, however, that Article XXX:2 puts a potential break on the possibility for countries 
to opt out of GATT amendments: “The CONTRACTING PARTIES may decide that any amend-
ment . . . is of such a nature that any contracting party which has not accepted it within a period 
specified . . . shall be free to withdraw from this Agreement, or to remain a contracting party with 
the consent of the CONTRACTING PARTIES.” GATT, supra note 5, art. XXX:2. 
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able to agree to majority voting. Yet, in my view, a crucial factor explaining 
the equilibrium found in the original GATT text is not internal or self-
referential to either the law or politics axis. Rather, it relates to the bidirec-
tional interaction between the two poles. 
First, how did GATT manage so successfully to reduce tariff levels and 
how could negotiators possibly agree to simple majority voting rules, that is, 
such low levels of participation or voice? In the E.C., for example, it took 
decades to shift to majority voting and even then only for limited fields and 
pursuant to some super majority, not a simple majority.53 In my view, it is 
the GATT’s weak legal-normative structure, i.e., its low level of discipline 
and many exit options, that explains GATT’s early success and majority vot-
ing rules. Is it not logical that when countries know that if worst comes to 
worst exit from obligations is possible, they will more easily make commit-
ments? And that they will, moreover, not bother too much about how new 
rules are created nor even mind that their voice, protest, or veto may get lost 
in a majority voting procedure? In other words, when levels of discipline or 
precommitment are low and obligations are not rigidly enforced, is it not 
normal that countries make broader and deeper commitments and more eas-
ily agree to future decisionmaking by majority vote?54 Any new rule that 
would emerge against their will can, in any event, still be exited from thanks 
to the thinness of the legal-normative structure. A similar balance was struck 
in the United Nations (“U.N.”) Charter.55 
Second, how can one explain the low levels of discipline, many escape 
clauses, weak remedies, and essentially political enforcement mechanism of 
GATT 1947, all of which deviate from general international law?56 Con-
versely, and here is the bidirectional or even circular force of the law-and-
politics narrative, the GATT’s low levels of politics and participation, e.g. 
lack of formal ratification and majority-voting rules, explain the low levels 
of discipline and multiple exit options under the original GATT, e.g. the ex-
isting legislation clause and weak dispute process. Indeed, when faced with 
low levels of politics, participation, and contestation, including a system of 
easy, majority-based decisionmaking, is it not normal that countries insisted 
on escape clauses and a hard law enforcement mechanism was seen as un-
desirable? Given the inherent risk of being outvoted in the creation of new 
                                                                                                                      
 53. Paul Craig & Gráinne de Búrca, E.U. Law: Text, Cases, and Materials 153–55 
(3d ed. 2003). 
 54. As Jackson pointed out, “nations often can simply violate the [GATT] obligations or 
CONTRACTING PARTY decisions without the fear of much penalty . . . . Since Article XXV is so 
loosely and broadly drafted, it may be that a very important escape valve and check upon the 
CONTRACTING PARTIES’ power is the practical ability of most states to refuse to obey GATT.” 
Jackson, supra note 33, at 127–28. 
 55. Compare U.N. Charter art. 18 (stating that U.N. General Assembly resolutions are not 
legally binding, hence countries could agree to their adoption by majority vote), with U.N. Charter 
art. 27 (stating that U.N. Security Council resolutions are legally binding, hence countries, at least 
the most powerful ones, required a veto). 
 56. See Pauwelyn, supra note 43 (stating that standard international law imposes cessation of 
breach and reparation). 
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rules and the uncertainties of the future, such as shifts in supply and de-
mand, technological advances, election cycles, changes in political 
majorities, and domestic social preferences, could it not be expected that 
negotiators would be averse to strong rule-enforcement, and want to keep 
certain exit options open?57 
In sum, because of low levels of law or discipline in the form of escape 
clauses and weak dispute settlement, the low levels of politics or participa-
tion, such as majority voting, became digestible and could be sustained. At 
the same time, because of low levels of participation or politics, only rela-
tively low levels of discipline or law could be agreed to and only such low 
levels were manageable. 
B. GATT’s Quiet Mutation (1947–1994) 
Departing from an early balance between low discipline and low partici-
pation, as soon as GATT became operational, the original equilibrium 
gradually shifted toward more discipline and harder law, including less exit, 
and more participation or politics, including more demands for voice. This 
occurred piecemeal and over time, hence the reference to GATT’s quiet mu-
tation. It demonstrates the living, dynamic interaction between law and 
politics, exit and voice. A change on one side of the spectrum, however 
small, necessarily affects the other. 
1. More Law: From a Political Enforcement 
Process to Gradual Legalization 
That GATT’s legal-normative structure gradually thickened is well 
documented. As pointed out earlier, most discussions of the evolution of the 
world trade system focus on just that.58 On substance, seven rounds of tariff 
negotiations dramatically reduced import duties on industrial goods and in 
1979 the Tokyo Round Codes expanded GATT discipline to include the far 
more sensitive field of nontariff barriers as well.59 Moreover, whilst in the 
text of GATT, the enforcement mechanism was part and parcel of the politi-
cal structure, over time GATT’s dispute process was detached from 
mainstream decisionmaking. At an early stage GATT parties, rather than 
making rulings themselves within the diplomatic process, referred Article 
XXIII complaints to a so-called Working Party. This was a smaller group of 
                                                                                                                      
 57. See George W. Downs & David M. Rocke, Optimal Imperfection? Domestic Un-
certainty and Institutions in International Relations 100 (1995); Ian R. Macneil, 
Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical and Rela-
tional Contract Law, 72 Nw. U. L. Rev. 854 (1978); Alan O. Sykes, Protectionism as a 
‘‘Safeguard’’: A Positive Analysis of the GATT ‘‘Escape Clause’’ with Normative Speculations, 58 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 255 (1991). 
 58. See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text. 
 59. The Tokyo Round Codes dealt with government procurement, technical standards, cus-
toms valuation, aircraft, import licensing procedures, anti-dumping, and subsidies. 
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countries, generally including the principal actors in the dispute as well as a 
number of interested parties and so-called “neutrals.” The countries in the 
Working Party discussed, negotiated, and eventually voted on the questions 
before them and, when successful in reaching some agreement (albeit one 
imposed by majority vote), recommended a way forward to the GATT 
membership, which, in turn, adopted or declined to adopt the recommenda-
tion under the Article XXV majority voting rule.60 Soon the number of 
neutrals exceeded the number of interested parties and the Working Party 
process transformed from a purely diplomatic exercise to a modified form of 
third-party adjudication.61 The next step was to replace the Working Party 
with a so-called “panel” made up exclusively of neutral countries before 
which the disputing parties would plead their case,62 and later composed of 
individuals acting in their own, individual capacity.63 With the establishment 
of “panels”—a word derived from the term “panel of experts,” evoking no-
tions of technical expertise and impartiality—the role and input of the 
GATT Secretariat increased. Highlighting the increased focus on an objec-
tive application of the rules, rather than an evaluation of the political 
sensitivities at stake, in 1981 the GATT, for the first time in its history, es-
tablished a legal office.64 
After the conclusion of the Tokyo Round in 1979, GATT parties further 
streamlined and legalized the dispute process. In 1980, they adopted the 
Agreed Description of Customary Practice and an Understanding on Dispute 
Settlement.65 In 1982, a Ministerial Declaration issued recommendations on 
how to make GATT adjudication more effective to include expediting the 
process, strengthening the role of the GATT Secretariat, calling for clearer 
decisions and recommendations, and clarifying the implementation stage.66 
In a 1984 decision, important improvements were made in the procedures 
                                                                                                                      
 60. Hudec, Diplomacy, supra note 19, at 75–78. 
 61. The Australian Subsidy case (complaint by Chile) was a trendsetter in this respect. See 
Report Adopted by the CONTRACTING PARTIES, Australia—Subsidy on Ammonium Sulphate (Apr. 
3, 1950), GATT B.I.S.D. (2d Supp.) at 188 (1952) [hereinafter the Australian Subsidy case]. 
 62. The first such panel was created at the Seventh Session of GATT contracting parties, in 
1952. Interestingly, it was set up to deal with all complaints raised during that session, not just one 
particular dispute. Summary Record of the Fifth Meeting, GATT Doc. SR.7/5, at 6 (Oct. 13, 1952) 
(recommending establishment of panel); Summary Record of the Seventh Meeting, GATT Doc. 
SR.7/7, at 7–9 (Oct. 18, 1952) (determining composition of panel). 
 63. See Summary Record of the Seventh Meeting, GATT Doc. SR.9/7 at 6 (Nov. 5, 1954); 
Hudec, Diplomacy, supra note 19 at 90. 
 64. Robert E. Hudec, Enforcing International Trade Law: The Evolution of the 
Modern GATT Legal System 70–71 (1993) [hereinafter Hudec, Evolution]. 
 65. Understanding regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveil-
lance (Nov. 28, 1979), GATT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) at 210–19 (1980); see also Robert E. Hudec, 
GATT Dispute Settlement after the Tokyo Round: An Unfinished Business, 13 Cornell Int’l L.J. 
145 (1980). 
 66. Ministerial Declaration, L/5424 (Nov. 29, 1982), GATT B.I.S.D. (29th Supp.) at 9, 10 
(1983). 
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for panel selection.67 In a 1988 midterm agreement in the context of the new 
Uruguay Round, further procedural rules were set out.68 
2. More Politics: From Majority Voting to a Consensus Practice 
As described earlier, the actual text of GATT opened the door for 
surprisingly low levels of participation or politics; in particular, joint GATT 
action by simple majority and relatively flexible amendment rules. In 1948, 
for example, Part II of the GATT was amended with less than unanimity.69 In 
1959 GATT parties adopted a recommendation on freedom of contract in 
transport insurance by majority decision.70 When granting waivers and 
deciding on the accession of new countries, GATT parties traditionally 
voted, each decision requiring just two-thirds of the votes cast.71 Equally, 
most results of the various GATT trade negotiation rounds were accepted by 
only a fraction of GATT parties. They were implemented through tariff 
protocols amending the GATT under the two-thirds majority rule, or separate 
side agreements such as the Tokyo Round Codes on nontariff issues.72 In this 
multiple-speed GATT, most developing countries steered away from 
additional obligations, in particular the Tokyo Round Codes, and even 
obtained exemptions from existing GATT provisions.73 
                                                                                                                      
 67. Dispute Settlement Procedures, L/5752, GATT B.I.S.D. (31st Supp.) at 9, 9–10 (1985). A 
roster of nongovernmental individuals for use on panels was set up and the Director General was 
given the power to appoint panel members in case the parties disagreed. 
 68. Improvements to the GATT Dispute Settlement Rules and Procedures, L/6489 (Apr. 12, 
1989), GATT B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at 61–67 (1990). 
 69. Summary Record of Thirteenth Meeting, GATT Doc. GATT/1/SR.13, at 5 (Mar. 23, 
1948) (discussing two-thirds requirement for amendment). 
 70. Freedom of Contract in Transport Insurance (May 27, 1959), GATT B.I.S.D. (8th Supp.) 
at 26 (1960); Summary Record of the Ninth Meeting, GATT Doc. SR.14/9, at 15 (Jun. 9, 1959) 
(providing details of vote). 
 71. GATT, supra note 5, arts. XXV:5, XXXIII; see Jackson, supra note 33, at 122. 
 72. See Roessler, supra note 48, at 79. 
 73. In 1964, Part IV on Trade and Development was added to GATT. Protocol Amending the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade to Introduce a Part IV on Trade and Development, GATT 
B.I.S.D. (13th Supp.) at 2 (1965). The crucial element in Part IV was the abandonment of the basic 
GATT principle of reciprocity or balance of concessions as it applies to the relation between devel-
oped and developing countries. Furthermore, first through a 1971 waiver, Generalized System of 
Preferences, L/3545 (June 25, 1971), GATT B.I.S.D. (18th Supp.) at 24 (1972), and then perma-
nently in 1979 (the so-called Enabling Clause, Differential and More Favorable Treatment: 
Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries, L/4903 (Nov. 28, 1979), GATT 
B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) at 203 (1980) [hereinafter Differential and More Favorable Treatment]), de-
veloping countries obtained approval for major deviations from another cornerstone of the GATT 
system: the principle of non-discrimination. Most importantly, developed countries were now per-
mitted to grant tariff preferences to developing countries without having to extend them to the 
developed world. 
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At the same time, voting soon became the exception74 and consensus  
decisionmaking the rule. In 1955, for example, GATT parties adopted, by 
consensus, resolutions on investment for economic development,75 the dis-
posal of surplus products,76 and the liquidation of strategic stocks.77 In 1979, 
a number of the Tokyo Round results were implemented by decisionmaking 
under Article XXV—including the so-called Enabling Clause in favor of 
developing countries—each time by consensus.78 In the majority of cases, 
prior to formal meetings an agreement was worked out. Only subsequently 
was a decision taken and this mostly by consensus as interpreted by the 
Chairman, that is, in the absence of a formal objection from any contracting 
party present on the floor (to be distinguished from unanimity of all par-
ties).79 This consensus practice guaranteed higher levels of participation and 
voice than the majority-voting rule on the books. Each GATT party could 
make its voice heard, a voice that was, at least on paper, the same for each 
party pursuant to the one-member-one-vote rule. Moreover, under the con-
sensus rule, each GATT party could threaten a veto, a risk that increased 
debate, contestation, and participation and, in short, amplified the level of 
politics in the decisionmaking process.80 
Although gradually legalized and extracted from the political process, 
crucial decisions in GATT dispute settlement—such as panel establishment 
and the adoption of panel rulings—followed this general trend. Like other 
decisions under Article XXV, they gradually required consensus, instead of 
simple majority. In theory, this granted each GATT party the right to veto or 
block progress in the dispute process.81 Unlike the impression sometimes 
                                                                                                                      
 74. For exceptions, see the vote in 1985 in favor of holding a special GATT session to launch 
the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations and the vote in 1990 on a waiver for the German Democ-
ratic Republic’s trade preferences to the former Soviet Bloc countries, both reported in Claus-Dieter 
Ehlermann & Lothar Ehring, Decision-Making in the World Trade Organization: Is the Consensus 
Practice of the World Trade Organization Adequate for Making, Revising and Implementing Rules 
on International Trade?, 8 J. Int’l Econ. L. 51, 61 (2005). 
 75. See International Investment for Economic Development (Mar. 4, 1955), GATT B.I.S.D. 
(3d Supp.) at 49 (1955). 
 76. See Disposal of Surpluses (Mar. 4, 1955), GATT B.I.S.D. (3d Supp.) at 50 (1955). 
 77. See Liquidation of Strategic Stocks (Mar. 4, 1955), GATT B.I.S.D. (3d Supp.) at 51 
(1955). 
 78. Differential and More Favorable Treatment, supra note 73, at 203.  
 79. As a former legal adviser to GATT concluded, “[t]here is no instance in the history of the 
GATT in which the Contracting Parties have used their powers under Article XXV:1 to impose new 
policy obligations [to be distinguished from non-binding recommendations] on contracting parties 
unwilling to accept them.” Roessler, supra note 48, at 79. 
 80. The informal nature of the consensus practice also permitted giving a voice to countries 
that were only provisional or de facto GATT parties. Those countries were also actively participating 
in the decisionmaking process without much regard for their formal lack of a vote. Jackson, supra 
note 33, at 123. 
 81. A 1982 Ministerial Declaration, Ministerial Declaration, GATT B.I.S.D. (29th Supp.) at 
9, 10 (1983), explicitly confirmed, for the very first time, the consensus principle for any decision 
by GATT parties in dispute settlement. The subsequent 1988 midterm agreement, in somewhat 
ambiguous terms, took away the veto for the establishment of panels but confirmed the veto for the 
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created by WTO commentators, however, in most GATT disputes such 
blocking did not materialize,82 and the adoption of Working Party and panel 
reports occurred by consensus, often with little discussion.83 It was only in 
the late 1980s and especially the early 1990s that the possibility of vetoing 
progress in the GATT dispute mechanism led to serious foot-dragging, 
blocking, refusals to conform to panel rulings, and non-authorized retalia-
tions.84 In other words, over time, GATT dispute settlement was not 
uniformly legalized, as witnessed by neutral panels and an increased role for 
the Secretariat, and some aspects of it actually became more and more po-
litical, in particular panel establishment and adoption. 
3. GATT’s Quiet Mutation as a Bidirectional Interaction 
Between Law and Politics 
Like the low levels of discipline and participation in the text of GATT 
1947, the gradual thickening of the GATT’s normative structure toward 
more discipline or law and the increased politicization in its decisionmaking 
toward more participation and contestation, including a move to a consensus 
practice, can be explained on the basis of self-referential factors, internal to 
either the law or politics pole. On the law or discipline side, for example, the 
legalization of dispute settlement could be explained by a mounting belief in 
the rule of law amongst GATT parties and GATT panelists alike and the re-
sulting conviction that third-party adjudication is the best and fairest method 
for dispute resolution. In addition, the stricter enforcement of GATT can be 
explained as a necessary feature to maintain support for trade liberalization. 
With tariffs gradually reduced, GATT had to tackle nontariff barriers such as 
environmental or health standards, antidumping duties, and subsidies, which 
                                                                                                                      
adoption of panel rulings and authorizations to suspend concessions. Improvements to the GATT 
Dispute Settlement Rules and Procedures, L/6489 (Apr. 12 1989), GATT B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at 
61, 63 ¶¶ F(a), G(3). 
 82. The very first time in GATT history that a defendant blocked the establishment of a panel 
occurred only in 1972 in the U.S.-E.C. Compensatory Taxes on Imports case. Hudec, Evolution, 
supra note 64, at 54. Even then, the reason was not some systemic objection to GATT deciding the 
dispute, but rather that the tax in question would be abolished the same year, a promise that the E.C. 
eventually kept. Id. at 453–54. The adoption of panel reports had only been vetoed once in GATT 
history up to 1986, namely in the very contentious 1976 DISC case between the U.S. and the E.C. 
See id. at 46. Even there the report was eventually adopted, albeit only five years later. United States 
Tax Legislation, L/4422 (Nov. 2, 1976), GATT B.I.S.D. (23d Supp.) at 98–114 (1977) (describing 
the report); Hudec, Evolution, supra note 64, at 456 (detailing its later adoption). 
 83. Hudec, Diplomacy, supra note 19, at 80 (discussing the Australian Subsidy case, supra 
note 61); id. at 89 (remarking that the substance of reports of the Seventh Session Panel were not 
even debated). 
 84. In the politically charged report United States—Imports of Sugar from Nicaraugua, 
L/5607 (Mar. 13, 1984), GATT B.I.S.D. (31st Supp.) at 67–74 (1985), the U.S. refused to defend the 
complaint in GATT, but did not block the process. Once adopted, however, the U.S. announced that 
it had no intention of complying with the panel ruling. Hudec, Evolution, supra note 64, at 176, 
513. Both the Pasta and Citrus panel rulings were blocked by the E.C. The U.S. then retaliated in 
the Citrus case by increasing tariffs on E.C. pasta imports, thereby linking the two cases. The E.C. 
counter-retaliated with higher tariffs on U.S. lemon and walnut imports. The year after, the parties 
reached a settlement in both cases. Id. at 493, 502. 
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were increasingly used to circumvent tariff commitments. This exercise 
proved far more contentious, stirring the attention of democratic politics, 
and required more open-ended rules. To obtain a minimum of compliance 
with the new disciplines, which were much harder to monitor and enforce, a 
stronger enforcement mechanism was needed. 
Equally, the consensus practice and general increase in the levels of 
politics and contestation in GATT affairs has explanations self-contained 
within the politics pole. The 1960s marked the beginning of a gradual ero-
sion of the clublike GATT, centered on an expert consensus on how to 
improve postwar trade relations.85 Deep substantive disagreements came into 
the open due to a stream of new and extremely diverse GATT members—in 
particular, the E.C., Japan, and newly independent, developing countries86—
and the emergence of novel trade problems for which the original GATT did 
not provide a blueprint—in particular, nontariff barriers.87 In this new con-
text, levels of contestation and politics rose naturally and consensus 
decisionmaking became a necessity if everyone was to be kept on board. 
Although the above internal explanations elucidate much of the GATT’s 
quiet mutation, in my view, they miss a key factor. This key factor resides 
not on either side of the law-politics spectrum but in the interaction between 
the two poles. In the same way that low discipline and low participation mu-
tually supported each other in the original GATT text, during the GATT’s 
forty-seven years of operation, gradually increasing levels of politics, par-
ticipation, and contestation enabled, and were the consequence of, 
progressive levels of discipline or law. More politics enabled more law. In 
turn, more law required more politics. 
On the one hand—and perhaps most importantly—the higher levels of 
contestation and politics in the decisionmaking process—in particular, the 
                                                                                                                      
 85. See Hudec, Diplomacy, supra note 19, at 67. 
 86. The E.C. replaced six key GATT parties with one new economic superpower whose 
goals and commercial policies were not part of the ITO/GATT heritage. Id. at 209. The E.C. was, 
according to many, concerned more with creating its own internal market than with liberalizing 
world trade. Japan’s rapid economic growth led to GATT membership in 1955, introducing another 
key player that was not part of the early ITO/GATT consensus and had yet another perspective on 
trade matters. Finally, thanks to decolonization, a steady stream of developing countries joined the 
GATT, most of them through simple sponsorship by their former colonial master. From its original 
twenty-three signatories, the GATT expanded to 100 participants in 1973, the increase made up 
almost entirely of developing countries. See id. 
 87. New topics emerged on GATT’s agenda, both because of the new membership and be-
cause of the replacement of the early postwar problems, which had gradually been resolved, with 
new questions of world trade around which no easy consensus emerged, namely: the creation of the 
E.C. (and the discrimination and new trade restrictions that came with it), the worsening trade posi-
tion of the developing countries (and the call for special economic development exceptions), the 
radical effects of postwar agricultural programs, and the emerging industrial competition from the 
non-Western world, especially in the field of textiles. Hudec, Diplomacy, supra note 19, at 209. 
More generally, whilst six rounds of tariff negotiations had reduced the average level of customs 
duties between the major developed countries to levels approaching commercial insignificance 
(under ten percent), id. at 214–15, new protectionism emerged in the form of so-called nontariff 
barriers (ranging from quotas and import licenses to technical standards and antidumping restric-
tions). To define and reduce protectionist nontariff barriers proved much more difficult than making 
tariff reductions. 
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consensus rule and effective veto power for each GATT party—enabled the 
thickening of the GATT’s legal-normative structure, including the legaliza-
tion of its enforcement regime. Indeed, if GATT parties have full control, 
including veto power, over the creation of GATT rules as well as the adop-
tion of GATT panel rulings, why would they fear the legalization of the 
GATT system? In this sense, higher levels of politics as seen in the consen-
sus practice explain GATT’s increase in law through the legalization of the 
dispute process. It was the consensus practice that made GATT legalization 
acceptable and digestible to GATT parties. On the other hand—and here 
again is the bidirectional or even circular interaction between law and poli-
tics—GATT legalization called for and cemented the need for more politics, 
participation, and contestation, including the GATT consensus practice. Faced 
with the gradual legalization of GATT dispute settlement, is it not normal that 
GATT parties became more aware of and sensitive to how GATT rules were 
made and how GATT rulings were adopted?88 In particular, is it not logical 
that when rules are enforced and become more real, countries make sure that 
no rule passes the political process without their consent, hence the consen-
sus practice? 
C. The WTO Eruption (1994–2004) 
In the previous Section, I referred to the changes that took place in the 
world trade system from 1947 to 1994 as a silent mutation. In this Section, I 
put the creation of the WTO in perspective, calling it an eruption rather than 
a big bang that in one instant transformed the trade system. My view, in 
other words, is that often the transformation that took place in the forty-
seven-year operation of GATT is underestimated, while that of the creation 
of the WTO is somewhat overblown. In the previous Section, I elaborated on 
the incremental, but overall crucial changes that occurred in the world trade 
system from 1947 to 1994. The creation of the WTO can only be under-
stood, and was only made possible, in the context of those multiple but less 
visible mutations. It is to the changes that occurred with the creation of the 
WTO that I now turn. 
1. Drastic Increase in Discipline and Law 
The WTO treaty significantly thickened the trade system’s legal-
normative structure. To begin with, almost fifty years after the failed ITO, a 
true international organization emerged with legal personality and an almost 
                                                                                                                      
 88. As Weiler put it in the context of the E.C.’s evolution:  
The “harder” the law in terms of its binding effect both on and within states, the less willing states 
are to give up their prerogative to control the emergence of such law or the law’s “opposability” 
to them. When the international law is “real,” when it is “hard” in the sense of being binding 
not only on but also in states, and when there are effective legal remedies to enforce it, deci-
sionmaking suddenly becomes important, indeed crucial. 
Weiler, supra note 16, at 34. 
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universal membership of close to 150 countries. A host of new substantive 
agreements, GATS, TRIPS, SPS, and TBT, were adopted and became bind-
ing on all WTO members pursuant to the single-package approach. With 
few exceptions, the multiple-speed GATT came to a halt and was transposed 
into a uniform WTO. Also, dispute settlement was streamlined. Most impor-
tantly, the right to veto the establishment of panels or the adoption of 
dispute rulings was taken away. To block the process, a so-called negative 
consensus of all members is now needed, making the process virtually 
automatic.89 In addition, the creation of a new, standing Appellate Body to 
hear appeals against panel rulings added significant weight to the independ-
ence and further legalization of the enforcement branch. Unlike GATT 
Article XXIII, which focused on maintaining a mere balance of concessions, 
the DSU for the first time, albeit implicitly, imposes a legally binding obli-
gation to comply with WTO rules and WTO dispute rulings.90 Crucially, the 
DSU not only increased the level of discipline imposed on reluctant defen-
dants (read: the E.C., which had blocked the GATT process in a number of 
cases brought by the United States). It also limited the exit options of what 
could be called aggressive complainants (read: the United States, which 
previously pursued certain GATT rights unilaterally under § 301 of the 1974 
Trade Act). Article 23 of the DSU obliges all WTO members to submit their 
WTO complaints to the WTO and not to pursue them unilaterally. In other 
words, complainants unhappy with the progress or result in WTO dispute 
settlement can no longer exit the WTO system and revert to self-help. 
The strengthening of the trade system’s normative structure was con-
firmed in the first ten years of the WTO’s operation. Close to 350 dispute 
proceedings were started91 and in all cases in which a panel was requested, it 
was established, notwithstanding the objections of defendants in certain 
cases.
92
 Similarly, in all cases in which a panel or Appellate Body ruling was 
circulated, it was adopted, even if the losers had major problems with the 
                                                                                                                      
 89. See supra note 6. 
 90. Trade compensation and reciprocal suspensions of concessions are explicitly defined as 
temporary solutions only. DSU, supra note 4, art. 22.1. The ultimate objective of the DSU is, 
thereby, either settlement or compliance. Paying compensation or suffering trade retaliation can no 
longer end a dispute. See John H. Jackson, International Law Status of WTO Dispute Settlement 
Reports: Obligation to Comply or Option to ‘Buy Out’?, 98 Am. J. Int’l L. 109 (2004); John H. 
Jackson, The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding—Misunderstandings on the Nature of Legal 
Obligation, 91 Am. J. Int’l L. 60 (1997); Pauwelyn, supra note 43. But see Judith Hippler Bello, 
The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding: Less is More, 90 Am. J. Int’l L. 416 (1996); Warren 
F. Schwartz & Alan O. Sykes, The Economic Structure of Renegotiation and Dispute Resolution in 
the World Trade Organization, 31 J. Legal Stud. S179 (2002).  
 91. See World Trade Organization, Dispute Settlement, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/ 
dispu_e/dispu_e.htm (last visited July 27, 2005). 
 92. See, in particular, the Cuban Liberty and Solidarity Act dispute, in which the U.S. threat-
ened not to attend panel meetings. Chairman of the Board, United States—The Cuban Liberty and 
Solidarity Act, U.N. Doc. WT/DS38/5 (Apr. 25, 1997) (communication from the Chairman of the 
Panel), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm#1996. The 
case was subsequently settled. 
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results.93 Illustrating the closure of exit for aggressive complainants, a cru-
cial WTO panel ruled that core aspects of § 301 of the U.S. Trade Act were 
not in violation of DSU requirements, albeit, only because the United States 
solemnly promised not to seek redress of its WTO rights inconsistently with 
the multilateral track imposed by the DSU.94 Apart from a few borderline 
situations, the United States has, indeed, no longer reverted to the unilateral 
enforcement of its WTO rights.95 From the perspective of other WTO mem-
bers, especially the weaker ones, this is a remarkable achievement. The new 
Appellate Body, in turn, streamlined panel case law and, like more conven-
tional judicial bodies, has opted for a rigorous, impartial, and strictly legal 
approach to analyzing trade complaints.96 It also placed WTO rules squarely 
within the broader field of public international law, thereby confirming their 
legally binding nature.97 
2. Modest but Important Increase in Participation and Politics 
Along with the creation of the WTO, crucial although less visible and 
noted changes also were implemented on the politics or participation pole. 
Importantly, for the first time ever, the WTO Agreement explicitly con-
firmed that “[t]he WTO shall continue the practice of decisionmaking by 
consensus followed under GATT 1947.”98 This confirmation—in deviation 
from the simple-majority voting rule in GATT Article XXV—offers stricter 
guarantees of participation and voice than a mere consensus practice devel-
oped over time. It cements the veto right of each and every WTO member. 
At the same time, the old majority-voting rule of GATT Article XXV was 
not entirely taken off the books; if, but only if, a decision cannot be arrived 
                                                                                                                      
 93. See, for example, the controversial ruling in Report of the Appellate Body, European 
Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-containing Products, U.N. Doc. 
WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001) [hereinafter E.C.—Asbestos], or the decision to grant a retroac-
tive remedy in the Australia—Leather dispute against the request of the complainant (U.S.) itself. 
Report of the Panel, Australia—Subsidies Provided to Producers and Exporters of Automotive 
Leather, U.N. Doc. WT/DS126/RW (Jan. 21, 2000). Both rulings were adopted. 
 94. Report of the Panel, United States—Sections 301–310 of the Trade Act of 1974, U.N. Doc. 
WT/DS152/R (Jan. 27, 2000). 
 95. See, for example, the E.C.—Bananas case, in which the U.S. imposed sanctions even 
before it had obtained WTO authorization. Report of the Appellate Body, European Communities—
Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, U.N. Doc. WT/DS27/AB/R (Sept. 9, 
1997) [hereinafter E.C.—Bananas]. This ruling was condemned in the U.S.—Certain Products case. 
Report of the Appellate Body, United States—Countervailing Measures Concerning Certain Prod-
ucts from the European Communities, U.N. Doc. WT/DS212/AB/R (Dec. 9, 2002). 
 96. See Robert Howse, Global Governance by Judiciary: The WTO Experiment 
with Appellate Review (forthcoming Nov. 2005). 
 97. See Pauwelyn, supra note 43; Joost Pauwelyn, The Role of Public International Law in 
the WTO: How Far Can We Go?, 95 Am. J. Int’l L. 535 (2001). 
 98. WTO Agreement, supra note 3, art. IX:1. A consensus is defined as a situation in which 
“no Member, present at the meeting when the decision is taken, formally objects to the proposed 
decision.” Id. art. IX:1 n.1. Article XVI:1 confirms the importance of GATT practice: “Except as 
otherwise provided . . . the WTO shall be guided by the decisions, procedures and customary prac-
tice followed by the CONTRACTING PARTIES to GATT 1947.” Id. art. XVI:1. 
PAUWELLYN REDO.DOC 9/20/2005 9:12 AM 
October 2005] The Transformation of World Trade 27 
 
at by consensus, the matter can be decided by voting.99 The WTO Agree-
ment did, however, introduce higher majority rules—ensuring higher levels 
of participation or voice—for specific decisions (to be resorted to, however, 
only if no consensus can be reached). A waiver now requires a three-fourths 
majority of all WTO members or in some cases even consensus,100 in con-
trast to GATT 1947 which merely required a two-thirds majority of votes 
actually cast.101 The adoption of an authoritative interpretation of WTO rules 
now requires a three-fourths majority of all WTO members,102 in contrast to 
the GATT 1947 practice of adoption by simple majority of votes cast pursu-
ant to Article XXV.103 
Besides embracing stricter decisionmaking rules, the WTO Agreement 
also reined in the scope of joint action by WTO members. Whilst under 
GATT Article XXV contracting parties had the power to meet and decide 
“with a view to facilitating the operation and furthering the objectives of 
[GATT],”104 Article IX of the WTO Agreement on decisionmaking does not 
confer any powers to WTO organs beyond those explicitly granted else-
where in the treaty, such as Article XII on accessions or the DSU on dispute 
settlement. As a result, WTO organs, such as the Ministerial Conference or 
General Council, no longer have the broad-ranging competence of deciding 
matters to facilitate the operation or further the objectives of the WTO 
treaty. Although the broad powers in GATT Article XXV were only occa-
sionally exercised, this change represents an important cutback on the 
powers of the GATT/WTO. 
Finally, the rules to amend the WTO treaty were tightened, thereby 
ensuring, once again, higher levels of participation. Instead of the two-thirds 
majority required for most amendments under GATT 1947, the WTO 
Agreement explicitly confirms the consensus practice.105 Although the 
fallback rule of a two-thirds majority continues to apply in many cases when 
no consensus can be reached,106 an increased number of amendments require 
                                                                                                                      
 99. Id. art. IX:1. 
 100. Id. art. IX:1 n.4 (stating that waivers of obligations subject to a transition period or a 
period for staged implementation “shall be taken only by consensus”). 
 101. Id. art. IX:3; GATT, supra note 5, art. XXV:5. 
 102. WTO Agreement, supra note 3, art. IX:2. 
 103. See Jackson, supra note 33, at 132–37. 
 104. GATT, supra note 5, art. XXV:1. 
 105. WTO Agreement, supra note 3, art. X:1. 
 106. Id. arts. X:1, :3, :5. WTO members not accepting the two-thirds majority amendment 
remain unbound by the amendment unless the amendment is “of a nature that would not alter the 
rights and obligations of the Members” (in which case the amendment is binding on all WTO mem-
bers), id. art. X:4, or three-fourths of WTO members decide that either a member must accept the 
amendment or it “shall be free to withdraw from the WTO or to remain a Member with the consent 
of the Ministerial Conference,” WTO Agreement, supra note 3, arts. X:3, :5; see also GATT, supra 
note 5, art. XXX:2. 
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unanimity or consensus without fallback majority voting.107 In particular, 
amendments to the DSU108 and the addition of new plurilateral agreements 
to the WTO treaty109 require consensus of all WTO members. The latter 
ensures the consent of all WTO members before the WTO adds a new 
agreement to its mandate even if such new agreement is eventually not 
binding on all WTO members. Put differently, a multiple-speed WTO is 
thereby possible only with the consent of all WTO members. 
Whilst the rules on the books might still leave some doubt as to the im-
portance of consensus (in particular given the remaining fallback of simple 
majority voting), the actual practice of WTO decisionmaking in its first ten 
years of operation eradicates all doubts. WTO members have zealously pro-
tected the consensus rule, and are clearly determined to defend their veto 
right and high levels of participation or voice.110 Apart from one decision on 
the accession of Ecuador111 and a few close calls where some countries 
pushed for a vote,112 in the first ten years of the WTO, no voting has taken 
place, not even on waivers or the appointment of director-generals. All deci-
sions were taken by consensus. Hence, notwithstanding the relatively light 
fallback voting rules on the books—three-fourths for waivers and interpreta-
tions, simple majority for most other decisions—all WTO activity occurred 
with the, albeit sometimes tacit, agreement of all WTO members. Although 
developing countries make up three-fourths of the WTO membership, they 
vehemently defended the consensus rule as well. As Lorand Bartels points 
out, “[S]o anxious are developing countries about their position in the WTO 
that both the Singapore and Doha Ministerial Declarations state expressly 
that any decision to negotiate on new issues . . . must be taken on the basis 
of explicit consensus. Mere silence [or a consensus decision not explicitly 
objected to] is no longer sufficient.”113 
                                                                                                                      
 107. See GATS, supra note 7, art. II:1; TRIPS, supra note 7, art. 4; WTO Agreement, supra 
note 3, art. X:2 (referring to WTO Agreement arts. IX and X); GATT, supra note 5, arts. I, II. 
 108. WTO Agreement, supra note 3, art. X:8. 
 109. WTO Agreement, supra note 3, art. X:9. 
 110. See, for example, the WTO Secretariat legal opinion that even the appointment of a 
facilitator to assist in the resolution of the Brazil-U.S. cotton dispute under the WTO Subsidies 
Agreement requires an “affirmative consensus.” Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting Held 
in the Centre William Rappard on 15 April 2003, ¶¶ 68–72, U.N. Doc. WT/DSB/M/147 (July 1, 
2003), criticized in Ehlermann & Ehring, supra note 74, at 8. 
 111. General Council Decision, Accession of Ecuador—Decision of 16 August 1995, n.1, 
U.N. Doc. WT/ACC/ECU/5 (Aug. 22, 1995) (“This Decision was adopted by the General Council by 
a two-thirds majority.”). 
 112. See E.C.—Bananas, supra note 95 (noting that the E.C. pushed for a vote against a U.S. 
request for sanctions authorization). This was also reported in Ehlermann & Ehring, supra note 74, 
at 64 nn.32–33. The contentious 1999 selection process for a new Director-General eventually led to 
a split appointment of two individuals each for three years. General Council, Appointment of the 
Next Director-General—Introductory Statement by Ambassador Ali Mchumo, Chairman of the Gen-
eral Council, U.N. Doc. WT/GC/26 (July 23, 1999). 
 113. Lorand Bartels, The Separation of Powers in the WTO: How to Avoid Judicial Activism, 
53 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 861, 865 (2004). 
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3. The WTO as a Bidirectional Interaction 
Between Law and Politics 
As was the case for the other two periods—the text of GATT 1947 and 
the forty-seven years operation of GATT—the changes that took place with 
the creation of the WTO can be explained in a self-referential manner, lim-
ited to either the law or the politics pole. For example, the monumental 
closure of exit in the DSU is, one hopes, at least partially due to the high-
spirited belief in the rule of law cherished by many Uruguay Round negotia-
tors. In particular, developing countries had long been supporters of 
legalization as they hoped that a rules-based system, without political ve-
toes, would put them on a level playing field with more economically 
powerful parties.114 Another, probably more important, internal reason that 
explains the DSU revolution is of a blunter, realpolitik nature, namely a deal 
between the United States, on the one hand, and most other countries (in 
particular the E.C. and Japan), on the other. In exchange for automaticity in 
the dispute process (that is, the E.C. and Japan relinquishing their veto 
rights), the United States agreed to stop unilateral enforcement through 
§ 301.115 Finally, the forty-seven years of GATT experience, in particular the 
increasing difficulty of implementing trade agreements on nontariff meas-
ures such as the Tokyo Round codes, had taught a lesson: if the ambitious 
Uruguay Round agreements were to be worth the paper they were written 
on, they had to be backed up by a credible and effective dispute settlement 
mechanism. Previous experience had shown that this had to include, eventu-
ally, the surrender of the veto right. For the GATT/WTO to be a way out of 
the prisoner’s dilemma of trade policy, a credible enforcement mechanism 
had to be in place to dissuade defectors. To outweigh the opposition to freer 
trade, the supporters of the WTO had to be reassured that this time the con-
cessions obtained would stick. 
As with the other two periods, my claim is, however, that these internal 
explanations miss a key factor. That key factor is encapsulated in the bidi-
rectional interaction between law and politics. One of the main objectives of 
this Article is to demonstrate that legal change occurs gradually, in tandem 
with developments in the political process. The surrender of the veto right in 
the new DSU was not a big bang that emerged out of the blue. Like the 
magical date of 1992 in the E.C.’s transformation,116 the concessions in the 
                                                                                                                      
 114. Julio Lacarte-Muró & Petina Gappah, Developing Countries and the WTO Legal and 
Dispute Settlement System: A View from the Bench, 3 J. Int’l Econ. L. 395 (2000). 
 115. Hudec, Evolution, supra note 64, at 222–31, 237 (“Governments who preferred a 
more cautious, more voluntary adjudication system had apparently persuaded themselves that the 
risk of unchecked U.S. legal aggression was a greater danger than an excessively demanding GATT 
legal system.”). For reasons why the European Community could conclude the DSU, see Theofanis 
Christoforou, The World Trade Organization, Its Dispute Settlement System and the European Un-
ion: A Preliminary Assessment of Nearly Ten Years of Application, in L’Intégration Européenne 
au XXIe Siècle: En Hommage à Jacques Bourrinet 257 (2004).  
 116. See infra text accompanying note 141. 
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DSU that still mystify international lawyers were indeed a landslide, but one 
having its roots in a long history of smaller and bigger earthshocks. The veto 
right was not written in the GATT itself. GATT provided, on the contrary, 
for simple majority voting and the veto came about only gradually, first in-
voked as late as 1972,117 through subtle interactions between law and 
politics. The surrender of the veto occurred through a similar incremental 
process, closing off a major exit route, while injecting new levels of voice. 
As expected under the law-and-politics paradigm, the closure of exit, 
imposition of harder law, and general increase in discipline as found in auto-
matic DSU procedures, as well as an obligation to follow the multilateral 
DSU track, called for equally important inputs of politics or voice including 
harder lawmaking. As squeezing a balloon on one side will automatically 
inflate the other, squeezing exit options inflated the need for voice or par-
ticipation. As a result, the WTO’s further legalization led quite naturally to 
higher demands for voice or participation, including veto rights in the politi-
cal decisionmaking process, higher fallback majority rules, and tougher 
amendment provisions. Because WTO norms can now be enforced through 
an automatic dispute process with limited exit options, control of the norm 
itself, that is, at the time it is created, is the only possible solution for indi-
vidual WTO members. This also explains why, to this date, WTO members 
continue to defend zealously the consensus rule and carefully preserve their 
veto right over any changes to the WTO bargain. As noted earlier, with one 
exception, no WTO decision was taken by vote and all passed pursuant to 
the consensus rule.118 
Crucially, this pressure for voice or participation at the state-party  
level emerged with equal force for nonstate actors outside the WTO. The 
former (state pressure) strengthened the system’s internal legitimacy; the 
latter (nonstate actor pressure) questioned its external legitimacy. Because 
trade obligations gradually moved from the dry, technical field of tariffs  
to the hardcore political controversies of, for example, health and  
environmental standards, the world trade system affected and drew the at-
tention, protest, and voice not just of governmental trade elites and 
businesses, but also of NGOs, consumers, and citizens at large. As 
Keohane and Nye argued in the broader context of international economic 
institutions: 
[T]hese pressures on international institutions are, ironically, reflections of 
their success. If international institutions were unimportant . . . no one 
would care about their legitimacy. But it is now recognized that the poli-
cies of the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO make a difference. Hence 
they are judged not only on the quality of the results that these policies 
                                                                                                                      
 117. See supra note 82. 
 118. See supra text accompanying note 111. 
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yield, but also on the procedures through which the policies are devel-
oped.119 
Put differently, because the WTO matters—in the words of the Appellate 
Body, it is about “the real world where people live and work and die”—and 
its rules are real in that exit options are reduced, questions of international 
governance and legitimacy arise. This was not the case in respect of GATT 
1947, which focused on tariffs, with multiple options to exit. Nor are legiti-
macy and democratic deficit hot topics at institutions that the public 
continues to perceive as largely technical, such as the International Tele-
communications Union (“ITU”) or the World Meteorological Organization 
(“WMO”). The same applies for organizations that, like GATT 1947, have a 
weak enforcement mechanism, even if they deal with high political topics 
and decide by majority vote. Such an institution is the U.N. General Assem-
bly, whose resolutions are not legally binding and hence do not attract the 
same levels of contestation and voice.120 
Conversely—and here again is the bidirectional (even circular) force of 
the law-and-politics narrative—it was not only the increase in discipline or 
law that enhanced the need for politics or participation. The reverse was also 
true: countries could only accept the dramatic increase in legalization and 
digest the automatic and compulsory enforcement of WTO obligations un-
der the new DSU once they were reassured that, in the political process, no 
new obligations could arise without their consent.121 It is this enhanced 
voice, or participation in the political process, that gave WTO members the 
confidence to engage in the revolutionary transformation of the dispute 
process and to accept it with relative equanimity.122 
                                                                                                                      
 119. Robert O. Keohane & Joseph E. Nye, Jr., The Club Model of Multilateral Cooperation 
and Problems of Democratic Legitimacy, in Efficiency, Equity, and Legitimacy: The Multi-
lateral Trading System at the Millennium 272 (Roger B. Porter et al. eds., 2001). 
 120. See supra note 55. Eric Stein, after reviewing four intergovernmental organizations “con-
firms the correlation between the level of integration (normative-institutional and empirical-social), 
on the one hand, and the intensity of the discourse on the democracy-legitimacy deficit, on the 
other.” Eric Stein, International Integration and Democracy: No Love at First Sight, 95 Am. J. Int’l 
L. 489, 530 (2001). 
 121. As Weiler explains in the Community context: 
Instead of a simple (legal) cause and (political) effect, this subtler process was a circular one. 
On this reading, the deterioration of the political supranational decisional procedures [in the 
WTO, the consensus-based, inefficient rulemaking procedures] . . . constituted the political 
conditions that allowed the Member States to digest and accept the process of constitutionali-
zation. Had no veto power existed, had intergovernmentalism not become the order of the day, 
it is not clear to my mind that the Member States would have accepted with such equanimity 
what the European Court was doing. They could accept the constitutionalization because they 
took real control of the decisionmaking process, thus minimizing its threatening features. 
Weiler, supra note 16, at 36. 
 122. It is, indeed, those increases in voice or participation (consensus decisionmaking and the 
creation of a new Appellate Body that permits countries to voice their concern about panel rulings) 
that John Jackson pointed to in his 1994 Congressional testimony when trying to convince the U.S. 
Congress that the new WTO, and particularly the DSU, would not infringe U.S. sovereignty. John 
Jackson, Testimony Prepared for the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, June 14, 1994, in 
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In sum, higher levels of participation or politics at the WTO were not 
only a consequence of further legalization; they were, at the same time, an 
absolute precondition without which further legalization could not have 
taken place. Put differently, as much as higher levels of law and discipline 
increased the need for participation, voice, and politics, stronger outlets for 
voice and more politics enabled and supported further legalization. The con-
sensus rule in the political process, prevailing under this balance, 
unmistakably led to a lourdeur in WTO decisionmaking. Viewed through 
the law-and-politics paradigm, however, it was and remains the crucial fac-
tor: the price to be paid for an automatic and compulsory DSU. Without the 
consensus rule and other reinforcements of politics, WTO members could 
not have accepted and digested the dramatically more legalized WTO. 
In this light, the WTO’s hard law combined with its hard lawmaking 
process or, as most put it these days, the combination of a highly efficient 
dispute process and a consensus-based, inefficient rulemaking procedure, 
should no longer strike us as an “institutional paradox.”123 To the contrary, 
this asymmetry can now be explained as a perfectly logical—although not 
necessarily optimal—balance between high discipline or law and high par-
ticipation or politics.124 In addition, contrary to common perception, the 
thicker normative structure of the trade system, although undoubtedly 
strengthening the WTO, did not come at the expense of individual members. 
On the contrary, through the consensus rule and related veto, the power of 
individual members was strengthened. Legalization only materialized be-
cause of more—not less—politics (including consensus decisionmaking). 
                                                                                                                      
Government Printing Office, Hearings on the WTO and U.S. Sovereignty, reprinted in 
The WTO as an International Organization 176 (Anne O. Krueger ed., 1998). 
 123. See sources cited supra note 17. 
 124. From this perspective, the period of the creation and early years of the WTO is not unlike 
what Joseph Weiler described as the “foundational period” of the European Community (from 1958, 
the creation of the E.C., to the middle of the 1970s). Analyzing this early period, Weiler discovered 
an apparent paradox similar to the now fashionable complaint heard in WTO circles about the im-
balance between the WTO judiciary (fully automatic and compulsory) and the WTO political branch 
(deadlocked by the consensus rule). He describes the paradox as follows: 
[F]rom a legal-normative point of view, the Community developed in that first phase with an 
inexorable dynamism of enhanced supranationalism. European legal integration moved power-
fully ahead [especially with the adoption by the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) of core 
Community doctrines, such as direct effect of Community law before domestic courts and su-
premacy of Community law over domestic law]. From a political-decisional-procedural point 
of view, the very same period was characterized by a counter-development towards intergov-
ernmentalism and away from European integration. 
Weiler, supra note 16, at 16. Under the law-and-politics paradigm, the successful legal-normative 
activity in this foundational period of the E.C. (spurred, in particular, by the ECJ) meant higher 
levels of discipline or law, that is, “Community obligations, Community law, and Community poli-
cies were ‘for real.’ ” Id. at 30. More discipline and closure of exit from the Community system had 
to increase the need for voice and participation. And so it happened. As Weiler recalls: “In what may 
almost be termed a ruthless process, Member States took control over Community decisionmaking.” 
Id. The best example of this “revenge by the Member States” was the legally dubious Luxembourg 
Compromise whereby de facto each and every Member State could veto Community-proposed 
legislation, notwithstanding the majority voting rules in the treaty itself. 
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Similarly, further legalization required and could only be maintained with 
more—not less—politics. 
D. The Law-and-Politics Curve of the World Trade System 
The law-and-politics narrative of the transformation from GATT to WTO 
can now be summarized in Chart 1 below. The vertical axis (“politics”) repre-
sents levels of participation and contestation, and the flexibility, accountability 
and input legitimacy that come with it. The horizontal axis (“law”) depicts 
levels of discipline, precommitment, and legalization, and the rule of law and 
welfare-enhancing trade liberalization that flow from it (both providing output 
legitimacy). The diagonal curve depicts the trajectory of international organi-
zations addressing subject matters that are politically sensitive and 
contestable. At those “politically sensitive” organizations, deeper integration 
requires more law and more politics. More discipline or law leads to more 
participation or politics. As countries know that the rules are real, they want a 
greater voice in their creation. Conversely, more participation or politics is 
what permits and sustains the imposition of higher levels of discipline or law. 
Without participation, contestation, and accountability, high levels of disci-
pline or legalization in politically sensitive areas would not be digestible and 
could not be sustained. The horizontal curve, in contrast, depicts the trajectory 
of technical institutions such as the ITU or the WMO addressing low politics 
questions that the public gladly leaves to expert decisions. This curve is hori-
zontal, at a constant low level of politics or contestation. No matter how 
strictly imposed or disciplined the organization’s rules, the level of politics or 
participation remains the same (government by experts rather than govern-
ment by representative politics). Depending on the technical or political nature 
of the subject matters covered, the curve of an organization may be steeper 
(more politically sensitive) or flatter (more technical) and, as happened with 
the GATT, can change over time. Crucially, deviations to the left of the diago-
nal curve, representing too much politics and/or not enough discipline, risk an 
ineffective organization such as the U.N. General Assembly (UNGA) or 
GATT in the 1960s. Deviations to the right of the diagonal curve, representing 
too much law or discipline and/or not enough politics or participation, risk an 
unsupported organization such as the current WTO. Put differently, deviations 
to the left may engender loyalty or input legitimacy but lack efficiency or out-
put legitimacy (loyalty without efficiency). Deviations to the right, in contrast, 
threaten a situation of efficiency without loyalty. 
The text of GATT 1947 is best situated on the horizontal, “technical or-
ganizations” curve, somewhere to the right of the diagonal, “politically 
sensitive organizations” curve (Point 1: “GATT 47”). As discussed earlier, the 
original GATT was framed as a technical, expert-driven organization dealing 
with low politics issues—tariffs—in a clublike, low-discipline fashion with a 
lack of formal ratification, majority decisionmaking, many escape clauses, 
and weak enforcement. In its early years of operation, however, the GATT 
quickly shifted to higher levels of participation and politics, including  
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decisionmaking by consensus, and somewhat higher levels of discipline, such 
as relatively effective dispute settlement (Point 2: “GATT 50s”). Spurred by 
the increasingly contested nature of its activities, including nontariff barriers, 
and a steady flow of new and diverse members, the GATT gradually changed 
tracks from the horizontal to the diagonal curve, from a technical to a more 
politically sensitive organization. In the 1960s and early 1970s, the increased 
levels of contestation and politics even brought the GATT to a temporary 
standstill and a virtually dormant dispute process125 (Point 3: “GATT 60s”). 
Thereafter, the organization, with renewed political impetus, continued its 
gradual process of legalization and expansion of trade disciplines to arrive, 
with the creation of the WTO, at a balance between relatively high levels of 
politics and participation, as reflected in the consensus rule and global contes-
tation of the organization, and dramatically increased levels of law and 
discipline, illustrated by a single-package deal of over thirty agreements and a 
compulsory dispute process (Point 4: “WTO 94”). As elaborated below, the 
current situation after ten years of WTO is, however, one of too much disci-
pline or law for the prevailing levels of participation and politics. As a 
deviation to the right of the diagonal curve, the trade system thereby risks ef-
ficiency without loyalty. 
Chart 1:  
Law and Politics from GATT to WTO 
 
                                                                                                                      
 125. See Hudec, Diplomacy, supra note 19, at 209–10 (“In one situation after another the 
rules could not be enforced and were put aside. Formal renegotiation was attempted in a few areas, 
but for the most part the old rules were simply allowed to lapse while parties searched for whatever 
ad hoc settlement could be found.”). 
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II. The Threat of a WTO Fortress 
Part I of this Article told and explained the story of the transformation of 
world trade using the alternative law-and-politics narrative instead of the 
conventional from-politics-to-law approach. Through this lens three distinct 
periods were discerned: the creation of the text of GATT 1947, the operation 
of GATT (1947–1994) and the WTO (1994–2004). My central claim was 
that for all three periods a crucial explanatory factor was the bidirectional, 
even circular, interaction between law and politics, discipline, and participa-
tion. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the system did not evolve from trade 
politics to trade law. Rather, both the level of law and the level of politics 
gradually increased. More politics enabled more law. More law required 
more politics. While both trends were continually present and reinforcing 
each other, the former was particularly strong during the GATT’s operation, 
the latter especially prevalent since the creation of the WTO. 
Part II of this Article shifts gears to savor the prescriptive force of the 
law-and-politics approach. Let there be no mistake: things are far from per-
fect in the world of trade. Gone are the days of a cozy GATT-club. Instead, 
the threat of a WTO fortress is looming, both for those outside and those 
inside the system. Many countries and people, in particular the poor and 
vulnerable, feel left behind or locked outside the WTO. For most developing 
countries, participation in the system remains elusive.126 Ordinary citizens in 
both poor and rich countries perceive the WTO as a fortress hard to pene-
trate, a system that operates, behind closed doors, in the interest of powerful 
producers and exporters, but is oblivious of the rural poor, and the plight of 
workers or the environment.127 In this sense, the WTO suffers, first and 
foremost, from a lack of popular support, loyalty, or input legitimacy. Yet, at 
the same time, unlike the early years of GATT, this lack of input legitimacy 
is no longer offset by progress in actual trade liberalization or output legiti-
macy. The increase in participation or politics that did take place over the 
years, in particular the insistence by WTO members on a political veto in 
decisionmaking, is currently stifling further welfare-enhancing liberalization 
and preventing much-needed reforms to make the system more equitable for 
developing countries and more open and supported by civil society. The 
deadlock in the political branch, combined with an automatic dispute proc-
ess, also risks giving too much power to what many see as un-elected, 
faceless bureaucrats on the judicial branch.128 As a result, the WTO is per-
ceived as a fortress even by those inside, that is, governments and domestic 
polities, tied up in the straightjacket of the WTO single package, with no 
                                                                                                                      
 126. See, e.g., Oxfam, Rigged Rules and Double Standards: Trade, Globalisation, 
and the Fight Against Poverty 5 (2002), at http://www.maketradefair.com/assets/English/ 
report_english.pdf (“The problem is not that international trade is inherently opposed to the needs 
and interests of the poor, but that the rules that govern it are rigged in favour of the rich.”). 
 127. See Lori’s War, supra note 9; Globalize This! The Battle Against the World 
Trade Organization and Corporate Rule (Kevin Danaher & Roger Burbach eds., 2000). 
 128. Barfield, supra note 17, at 1. 
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way out or forward, either because of economic necessity or because of the 
consensus rule and an ever-stricter enforcement mechanism. In sum, the 
WTO now lives in what one could call the worst of both worlds: it has a lack 
of input legitimacy in that it misses the benefits of popular support or poli-
tics and has a lack of output legitimacy because it must do without the 
benefits of further trade liberalization and a rule of law perceived as fair and 
equitable for everyone. 
In Part II of this Article, I first analyze the conventional proposals for 
WTO reform and explain why, in isolation, they are counter-productive. As 
an alternative to those proposals, focused exclusively on one side of the law-
politics spectrum, I then suggest a more comprehensive reform package that 
takes account of both the law and politics poles. My central claim is that 
such a balanced package, although less spectacular than other proposals, is 
more likely to make the trading system both more legitimate and more effi-
cient. 
A. How Not to Reform the WTO 
Knowing that the trade system currently reflects a combination of high 
discipline or law and high politics or participation (albeit focused on partici-
pation by member states)—if you wish, a combination of a highly efficient 
dispute process and a consensus-based rulemaking system—three major 
proposals for reform have most commonly been suggested: (1) soften the 
WTO’s decisionmaking rules so as to unlock the recurring political stale-
mates, or in the words of this Article reduce politics or participation by 
means of, for example, majority-based decisionmaking; (2) revert to a more 
political dispute process with more control by individual members over the 
results in specific trade disputes, or, in other words, reduce discipline by, for 
example, granting members the right to block the adoption of dispute rul-
ings; and (3) further legalize and/or depoliticize the WTO’s normative 
structure to better resist political pressures obstructing trade liberalization 
(in other words, further increase discipline through, for example, legal 
standing for private parties under the DSU or scrapping the system’s escape 
clauses). Each of these proposals is depicted in Chart 2 below. I shall now 
address them in turn. 
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Chart 2: 
Law and Politics of WTO Reform Proposals 
 
1. Facilitate Decisionmaking in the Political Process 
A first group of commentators suggests that we leave the WTO en-
forcement mechanism intact but facilitate its rulemaking process, in 
particular, by dropping the consensus requirement. Pascal Lamy, the former 
E.C. trade commissioner (and now WTO Director-General), for example, 
has called the WTO’s decisionmaking process “medieval.”129 Those com-
mentators would, in other words, maintain the high levels of discipline in 
the form of a strong DSU but reduce the strictures of high voice and partici-
pation through softer lawmaking procedures such as weighted or majority 
voting. This proposal is depicted in Chart 2 above, at Point 1 (“Majority Vot-
ing”). Debra Steger, for example, argues that the remedy lies in a smoother 
and more efficient rulemaking system. She explains her position thus: 
If the system is working very well in one aspect [dispute settlement] and 
poorly in another aspect [decisionmaking], should the effective part be 
changed to make it less effective, or should the ineffective part be im-
proved to make it stronger and more effective? Simple logic dictates that 
Members should fix the part that does not work, and leave the well-
functioning part alone.130 
Along the same lines, Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, a former Appellate Body 
member, argues that the “ideal solution is, of course, to facilitate and thus 
                                                                                                                      
 129. Charlotte Denny et al., Europe urges shakeup of ‘medieval’ WTO, The Guardian, Sept. 
16, 2003, at 15. 
 130. Debra P. Steger, Book Review, 5 J. Int’l Econ. L. 565, 567 (2002) (reviewing 
Barfield, supra note 17). 
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unblock the political decisionmaking process.”131 In the same breath, he adds 
that he is also “opposed to all suggestions that tend to turn the wheel of his-
tory back, in reintroducing elements of the original ‘diplomatic’ model of 
dispute settlement.”132 Robert Keohane is of a similar view: 
The institutions are a mess: too much judicialization, too little legislation 
. . . . If this is the problem, why not strengthen the legislative elements of 
the WTO? . . . [T]his change should correct the overweening influence of 
the Appellate Body, as Qualified Majority Voting in the E.U. has limited 
the ability of the European Court of Justice to make new law.133 
Other authors make more specific suggestions for the facilitation of 
WTO decisionmaking. Amrita Narlikar, for example, refers to the estab-
lishment of an “executive board” similar to that in the IMF and the World 
Bank.134 Thomas Cottier and Satoko Takenoshita have proposed the intro-
duction of a system of weighted voting, based on each WTO member’s 
trading power.135 Less drastic, the Sutherland report on the future of the 
WTO proposes the creation of a consultative body with membership re-
stricted to a maximum of thirty countries.136 
This first solution may be called the softer lawmaking or symmetry solu-
tion, favored mainly by insider institutionalists, for it would introduce a 
degree of symmetry between the powers and efficiency of the judicial and 
the political branch of the WTO. Notwithstanding its apparent logic and 
symmetrical feel-good factor, considering the law-and-politics curve above, 
the symmetry solution is not a solution at all. Indeed, quite the reverse. If, as 
I explained earlier, the lourdeur in the political WTO process is a natural 
response to higher levels of law and discipline, in particular a stricter dis-
pute process, and this lourdeur is, moreover, a political condition or sine 
qua non for WTO members to establish the DSU as well as to digest and 
accept the WTO’s increased levels of discipline, taking away the safety-
valve of consensus and veto would undermine the support for a strong WTO 
dispute mechanism. It could eventually threaten WTO disciplines more 
broadly in that WTO members, faced with weaker outlets for voice and the 
prospect of being outvoted, would more frequently seek to exit. This, in 
turn, would reestablish the expected equilibrium, but at the bottom of the 
                                                                                                                      
 131. Ehlermann, supra note 17, at 305; see also Ehlermann & Ehring, supra note 74, at 51 
(“Consensus . . . inherently favours the status quo and . . . does not provide for equality. . . . [I]t is 
questionable whether it is also more democratic than the majority rule.”). 
 132. Ehlermann, supra note 17, at 307. 
 133. Barfield, supra note 17, at 223 n.52 (quoting email from Robert Keohane to Claude 
Barfield (June 11, 2001)). 
 134. Amrita Narlikar, The Politics of Participation: Decision-Making Processes and Develop-
ing Countries in the World Trade Organization, 364 Round Table 171, 178–80 (2002). 
 135. Cottier & Takenoshita, supra note 21, at 184–86. The authors define trading power in 
terms of share of trade, gross domestic product, market openness (defined as proportion of imports 
to GDP), and population. Id.; see also Dmitri V. Verenyov, Comment, Vote or Lose: An Analysis of 
Decision-Making Alternatives for the World Trade Organization, 51 Buff. L. Rev. 427, 433 (2003). 
 136. See Sutherland Report, supra note 18, at 70–71. 
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diagonal curve, close to GATT 1947: less politics or participation, brought 
about by the “more efficient” rulemaking system, would lead to more pres-
sure on the exit side, such as a weaker DSU and more problems with 
noncompliance, or even total exit as in withdrawal from the WTO alto-
gether. In the end, rather than resolving the problem, the symmetry solution 
risks undermining the entire WTO regime. Hence the situation of the pro-
posal at Point 1 (“Majority Voting”) in Chart 2 above, which deviates to the 
right of the law-and-politics curve with the risk of an “unsupported” regime 
or efficiency without loyalty. Consensus decisionmaking is arduous, messy, 
and time-consuming. This is the price to pay, however, for a broadly sup-
ported and legitimate world trade system. Political deadlocks are 
unavoidable, and serious crises and threats of exit from the system part of 
the game. They should not be overblown137 since in the past they have 
proven to be crucial triggers for further progress. 
a. The Lessons from European Integration. The history of European in-
tegration offers useful lessons in support of maintaining high levels of voice 
or participation for each WTO member, at least in the foreseeable future. 
According to Joseph Weiler, the Community’s foundational period from 
1958 to the mid-1970s witnessed a dramatic increase in discipline or law in 
the form of constitutionalization mainly through the European Court of Jus-
tice, coupled with a surge in the need for member state voice or 
participation epitomized by a veto for each member state under the Luxem-
bourg Compromise.138 In some way, this is where the WTO stands today, 
toward the end of its foundational period, with an equilibrium between high 
discipline in the DSU and high participation through consensus decision-
making. Determining what happened after this foundational period in 
Europe may prove illustrative of what is in store for the WTO. Although 
consensus politics, in the shadow of the veto in the Luxembourg Compro-
mise, was needed to establish an equilibrium in the first, foundational period 
and to digest the expansion of Community powers in what Weiler discerns 
as a second crucial period,139 the costs of such consensus politics became 
apparent toward the end of the 1980s: 
[T]he Community became increasingly unable to respond to new chal-
lenges, that called for real policy choices. Thus, while consensus politics 
(the manifestation of enhanced Voice) explains the relative equanimity 
with which the jurisdictional limits of the Community broke down in the 
1970s, this very consensus model also explains why, within the  
                                                                                                                      
 137. See, e.g., Sungjoon Cho, A Bridge Too Far: The Fall of the Fifth WTO Ministerial Con-
ference in Cancún and the Future of Trade Constitution, 7 J. Int’l Econ. L. 219 (2004); 
Sutherland Report, supra note 18 (exaggerating the prospect of regionalism, a form of exit from 
the WTO, as a major threat to multilateralism although it has in the past proven to be a catalyst for 
multilateral agreement). 
 138. See Weiler, supra note 16, at 36. 
 139. Weiler discerns a second crucial period, which he calls a period of mutation, during 
which Community competences were drastically expanded and became virtually limitless (1973 to 
the early 1980s). Id. at 42–43. 
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Community’s expanded jurisdiction, it was unable to realize its most tradi-
tional and fundamental objectives, such as establishing a single market in 
the four factors of production.140 
This political deadlock—not unlike the one we now witness at the 
WTO—led to what Weiler distinguishes as the third period in the transfor-
mation of Europe: the modern era of 1992, i.e., the enactment of the Single 
European Act (“SEA”), and beyond. Key to the SEA’s success was an agree-
ment among E.C. member states to shift to (qualified) majority voting, at 
least for those decisions required to complete the single European market. 
The exit-voice, law-politics equilibrium, however, was thereby out of bal-
ance: majority voting meant reduced voice. So what was required in 
response? Indeed, a counterbalancing decrease in discipline or law, in other 
words, a number of cracks appeared in the constitutional structure of the 
Community: among other things, a national safeguard mechanism141 and the 
official acknowledgement of a multiple-speed Europe.142 At the same time, 
Weiler argues that further challenges to the Community’s legal-normative 
foundation may have been prevented by the member states’ sense of loyalty 
toward the European project: 
[A]cceptance of Community discipline may have become the constitu-
tional reflex of the Member States and their organs. A Loyalty to the 
institution may have developed that breaks out of the need for constant 
equilibrium. The two decades of enhanced Voice thus constitute a learning 
and adaptation process resulting in socialization; at the end of this period 
decisional changes affecting Voice will not cause a corresponding adjust-
ment to Exit.143 
Yet, loyalty in the Community sphere, Weiler explains, “is precarious 
because there is a legitimacy dissonance between the constitutional claims 
of the polity and its social reality.”144 Challenges of democracy and legiti-
                                                                                                                      
 140. Id. at 66. 
 141. See Treaty Establishing the European Community, Nov. 10, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 3, 
art. 95(4) [hereinafter E.C. Treaty] (permitting member states, subsequent to a harmonization meas-
ure at the Community level, to enact national measures as long as they are proven to be necessary, 
taken on legitimate grounds, and non-discriminatory); Weiler, supra note 16, at 69. 
 142. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, Nov. 10, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 
340) 2, arts. 11(2), 40, 43(g) (enabling closer or enhanced cooperation between a limited number of 
member states with the option for other member states to stay out); Weiler, supra note 16, at 73, 
99–101. Along the same lines, note that the new European Constitution, for the very first time, ex-
plicitly includes a provision permitting members to leave the E.U. altogether. Treaty Establishing 
the Constitution for Europe, Dec. 16, 2004, 2004 O.J. (C 310) 1, art. I-60 [hereinafter European 
Constitution]. This explicit option for total exit can be seen as another response to lower levels of 
voice. Although it may never be resorted to, the possibility provides an important, symbolical safety 
valve. 
 143. Weiler, supra note 16, at 77. 
 144. Id. at 99. 
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macy, especially social legitimacy, that is, “societal acceptance of the sys-
tem,”145 remain: 
People accept the majoritarian principle of democracy within a polity to 
which they see themselves as belonging. 
 . . . .  
. . . The current shift to majority voting might therefore exacerbate legiti-
macy problems. Even an enhanced European Parliament, which would 
operate on a co-decision principle, will not necessarily solve the legitimacy 
problem. The legitimacy crisis does not derive principally from the ac-
countability issue at the European level, but from the very redefinition of 
the European polity.146 
In other words, for Weiler, at the European level, as at any other level of 
governance, there can be no democracy without demos. 
What lesson can the world trade system learn from this European story? 
In my view, it is this: if even at the more integrated European level the need 
for voice or participation of individual member states was so strongly felt in 
response to increases in law or discipline, and an equally strong pressure to 
reduce law or discipline emerged when faced, for example, with majority 
voting, then a fortiori these interacting needs for participation and disci-
pline, voice and exit, must play a role at the more loosely integrated and 
wildly more diverse WTO. At the WTO level, individual members insist all 
the more on their sovereignty and the member-driven nature of the organiza-
tion.147 As a result, executive or majority-based voting at that level is likely 
to put even more pressure on the exit side. In addition, in Europe, decades of 
strong voice, participation, and vetoes gradually nurtured a sense of loyalty 
toward the European project, through “decades of enhanced Voice [and] . . . 
a learning and adaptation process resulting in socialization.”148 At the WTO, 
in contrast, the process of socialization has hardly begun. On the contrary, to 
the extent WTO legalization is equated with depoliticization, or keeping the 
trade game removed as far as possible from domestic politics, nontrade con-
cerns, and social contestation, the raison d’être of the WTO is to skirt 
engagement with the broader society. Indeed, it would not be unfair to say 
that at this moment most layers of society have serious doubts as to the 
WTO project, be it because they feel left behind, as developing countries 
feel, or because they perceive the WTO as a front for big business and de-
humanizing capitalist values. As a result, not enough loyalty exists in the 
WTO today either to replace voice or to keep exit at bay. In this context, 
without drastically reducing current levels of discipline or law and thereby 
weakening the system’s normative structure and effectiveness, it is hard to 
                                                                                                                      
 145. Id. at 80. 
 146. Id. at 83–85 (citation omitted). 
 147. Sutherland Report, supra note 18, at 69; Jackson, supra note 17, at 72. 
 148. Weiler, supra note 16, at 77. 
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imagine that any WTO member could accept being outvoted based on some 
majority-voting rule,149 be it a majority of WTO members (which would give 
disproportionate power to countries like Luxembourg and Trinidad and To-
bago) or, even less so, a majority of the people living in WTO members 
(which, of course, would hugely favor countries like China and India). If the 
emergence of a European demos is questionable, the feasibility of a world-
wide, WTO demos is even more elusive. Whatever other forms may exist to 
legitimize international governance,150 in the WTO none are currently strong 
enough to support the revolutionary shift from consensus to majority-based 
decisionmaking without seriously undermining the trade system’s effective-
ness, including its strong dispute process. The European story—and its on-
going quest for legitimacy notwithstanding the existence of a European Par-
liament (witness the 2005 referenda rejecting a proposed Constitution for 
Europe)—ought to warn the world trade community to be patient and to 
build on incremental changes and improvements. 
b. The Lessons from the Failed New International Economic Order 
(“NIEO”). The difficulty of setting up an effective and legitimate system 
based on majority voting at the world level is further illustrated by the fail-
ure of the NIEO. Strengthened by growing numbers and their power in the 
world economy, in particular because of the oil crises, in the 1960s and 
1970s developing countries became increasingly frustrated with the stric-
tures of the GATT system and the need for consensus to change it. As a 
result, they turned their attention to the U.N. and, through the much softer 
lawmaking process prevalent there, requiring only simple and two-thirds 
majorities,151 created “their own” United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD).152 Through a series of hotly contested U.N. Gen-
eral Assembly Resolutions, all adopted without the support of the developed 
world,153 they unilaterally declared the existence of a New International 
Economic Order, excusing themselves from any meaningful reforms and 
trade liberalization efforts, which should, after all, be beneficial to develop-
                                                                                                                      
 149. Crudely put, the big WTO players, such as the United States and the E.C., zealously 
defend the consensus rule so as not to be constantly outvoted by the large majority of WTO mem-
bers, three-fourths of which are developing nations. Equally, developing countries strongly defend 
the consensus rule because it protects them against the whim of the most powerful and gives them 
the security (or at least the illusion) of a veto for all WTO decisions. Recall in this respect that de-
veloping nations do not always form a homogeneous group and often have contradictory interests. 
Hence, for them as well there is a risk inherent in majority voting even in an organization that con-
sists of three-fourths developing countries. 
 150. See Daniel Bodansky, The Legitimacy of International Governance, 93 Am. J. Int’l L. 
596 (1999); Ruth W. Grant & Robert O. Keohane, Accountability and Abuses of Power in World 
Politics, 99 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 29 (2005) (calling on commentators to think outside the democratic 
box and laying out a series of accountability models based on participation and delegation);  
Keohane & Nye, supra note 119. 
 151. See U.N. Charter, art. 18, ¶¶ 2, 3. 
 152. G.A. Res. 1995, U.N. GAOR, 19th Sess., Supp. No. 15, U.N. Doc. 1/5815 (Dec. 30, 
1964). 
 153. See F.V. Garcia-Amador, The Emerging International Law of Development 171 
(1990). 
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ing countries themselves, whilst imposing strict obligations on the devel-
oped world and its economic operators active in developing countries. 
Hence, instead of working out a consensus at GATT, developing countries 
created the NIEO through the U.N. without the support of the developed 
world. Without any voice or support from those who, in economic and po-
litical terms, mattered most, they created a new regime hoping it would 
change the landscape of world trade. 
Viewed through the lens of the law-and-politics paradigm, the effort was 
doomed to fail: low or no voice at all cannot possibly keep exit at bay. As a 
result, the NIEO never had any real impact, especially not on developed 
countries, and ultimately ended in utter failure.154 With the benefit of hind-
sight, the consensus requirement in GATT that blocked the most extreme 
developing country demands may, therefore, have been the GATT’s savior 
as well as the secret of its further success when compared to the stagnation, 
ineffectiveness, and political infighting often seen in those days at, for ex-
ample, the U.N. General Assembly or, in the 1960s, UNCTAD. The harder 
lawmaking entailed by the consensus requirement was, indeed, a necessary 
feeding ground for the corresponding hardening of the GATT normative 
regime and the reduction in trade barriers and increase in welfare that came 
with it. In contrast, had developing countries been able to push ahead their 
NIEO demands within the GATT, without the support or voice of the major 
trading nations, the GATT would most likely have met the same fate as the 
NIEO: commercial irrelevance. 
c. Hidden Benefits of the WTO Consensus Rule. Let it be clear, finally, 
what the WTO consensus rule stands for.155 Consensus does not require the 
positive vote of each and every WTO member. In this sense, it differs from 
unanimity. A consensus decision implies a proposal that was not explicitly 
objected to by any WTO member present at the particular meeting.156 It is 
much easier to reach than unanimity, if only because there is no need to get 
the explicit vote of all 150 members. Countries not affected by, or not inter-
ested in, the issue at hand can remain silent. Given the shadow of the future, 
members have an incentive to use their veto sparingly, that is, only for deci-
sions vital to them. This makes consensus decisionmaking not completely 
                                                                                                                      
 154. See Thomas Franck, Lessons of the Failure of NIEO, in Canadian Council on Inter-
national Law, International Law and Development: Proceedings of the Fifteenth 
Annual Conference 82 (Brian Etherington et al. eds., 1986); Stephen Zamora, Voting in Interna-
tional Economic Organizations, 74 Am. J. Int’l L. 566, 608 (1980) (“An international economic 
organization that does not reflect actual economic forces, in its operations as well as in its decision-
making processes . . . has little promise as an active, effective agency.”). The NIEO was a failure not 
the least because it meant that for decades many developing countries missed the opportunity to 
reform their political and economic systems, thereby depriving themselves of participation in the 
world economy. 
 155. See Mary E. Footer, The Role of Consensus in GATT/WTO Decision-Making, 17 Nw J. 
Int’l L. & Bus. 653 (1996); Richard H. Steinberg, In the Shadow of Law or Power: Consensus-
Based Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATT/WTO, 56 Int’l Org. 339 (2002). 
 156. See Howse, supra note 96. 
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unlike decisionmaking by an executive committee.157 Crucially, the consen-
sus rule also resembles weighted voting in that it gives more weight to 
politically and economically powerful players.158 A consensus rule does not 
mean that every player has equal power.159 It thereby has the positive attrib-
ute of weighted voting in that it reflects power realities and does not give 
disproportionate weight to small or non-affected countries.160 This should go 
a long way in countering the criticism that consensus decisionmaking at the 
WTO gives too much power to developing nations who represent a small 
share in world trade but a three-fourths majority of the WTO membership. 
The criticism remains that under the consensus rule the big players have too 
much power. This risk is real but can be mitigated by repeat play and the 
shadow of the future. Evidence shows, for example, that recent developing-
country participation in WTO General Council meetings has increased dra-
matically as compared to the early years of the WTO.161 Moreover, when it 
comes to actual decisionmaking, even a coalition of the most powerful WTO 
players can eventually be blocked by the veto of a single developing coun-
try. Although small countries will not be able to use their veto often, for 
those questions that are crucial to them the veto remains a viable option. 
Finally, it must be recalled that the WTO treaty maintained a relic of de-
cisionmaking from GATT 1947, namely the rule that if no consensus can be 
reached on an issue, the fallback is, unless otherwise provided, majority vot-
ing. Although this option has not been exercised in the first ten years of the 
WTO’s existence, it may still play a role in the future. It would be sufficient 
for the threat of majority voting to become real. If so, consensus decision-
making would operate in the shadow of a vote. This would facilitate 
consensus building and may strengthen the voice of weaker countries. It 
may be appropriate, in this respect, to distinguish between different types of 
                                                                                                                      
 157. It avoids, however, the politically sensitive decision as to which countries sit on the 
committee, and has the benefit of having the flexibility of different “committees” depending on the 
issue. 
 158. See Hirschman, supra note 15, at 40 (“[V]oice is . . . conditioned on the influence and 
bargaining power customers and members can bring to bear [on] . . . the organizations to which they 
belong.”); Jackson, supra note 33, at 128. 
 159. See Steinberg, supra note 155, at 365 (“The GATT/WTO decision-making rules have 
allowed adherence to both the instrumental reality of asymmetrical power and the logic of appropri-
ateness of sovereign equality.”). 
 160. See Zamora, supra note 154. At the same time, the consensus rule avoids some of the 
major drawbacks of weighted voting: there is no need to agree ex ante on a list of votes by country, 
nor on the criteria that will be used to divide the votes. Within the informal structure of consensus 
decisionmaking, the major stakeholders, as well as their weight, can differ depending on the ques-
tion and interests at hand. 
 161. To give an indication, when comparing country participation during the first nine Gen-
eral Council meetings (Jan. 1995–Dec. 1995) to that during nine more recent General Council 
meetings (Dec. 2002–Feb. 2004), both in terms of intervention frequency and number of words, 
developing-country participation has boomed. During the former period (1995), the first developing 
country in terms of intervention frequency was only ranked sixth (Argentina, 3.6%, compared to the 
E.C., ranked first, with 10.8%). During the latter period (2002–2004), interventions were spread far 
more equally, with the U.S. ranked first at 5.4%, E.C. and India second with 3.6% each, and Kenya 
sixth with 2.8%. (Data and statistics are on file with the author.) 
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WTO decisions. So-called housekeeping or internal WTO decisions—such 
as the appointment of a new WTO Director-General162—could at times be 
taken by majority voting or at least in the shadow of majority voting. The 
same could be done for decisions that do not alter WTO rights and obliga-
tions, in particular authoritative interpretations which, on paper, need only a 
three-fourths majority. Such authoritative interpretations, even if taken only 
in the shadow of a vote, could facilitate legislative correction of unpalatable 
dispute rulings, i.e., offer an insurance policy for voice in the event dispute 
settlement goes wrong. This, in turn, could rectify one of the most important 
drawbacks of the current balance between high law or discipline and its effi-
cient dispute process and high politics or participation with its requirement 
for consensus in the political process.163 
2. Revert to a GATT-like, Diplomatic Dispute Settlement Process 
Instead of strengthening the political branch, for example through ma-
jority voting, a logical alternative to cure the current asymmetry between the 
WTO judicial and political branches is to weaken the judicial arm; in par-
ticular, to lower discipline or law under the DSU. The most vocal proponent 
of this solution is Claude Barfield of the American Enterprise Institute, a 
conservative think tank. When it comes to the asymmetry problem, 
Barfield’s focus is not so much on the inefficient rulemaking process, but 
rather on the new, judicialized WTO dispute system. He sees the DSU as 
“politically unsustainable . . . because the imbalance between ineffective 
rule-making procedures and highly efficient judicial mechanisms will in-
creasingly pressure the panels and the [Appellate Board] to ‘create’ law, 
raising intractable questions of democratic legitimacy.”164 To correct the 
asymmetry, which Barfield considers to be both an imbalance and a “consti-
tutional flaw” (although earlier, I explained why it is rather a logical—
although not necessarily optimal—equilibrium), he recommends alternatives 
that would reintroduce some of the former elements of “diplomatic” flexi-
bility that characterized the earlier GATT regime. In Barfield’s view, 
conciliation, mediation, and voluntary arbitration need to be added as real 
alternatives; in addition, if a substantial minority of WTO members clearly 
opposes a decision, a blocking mechanism should be used to set aside that 
decision until further negotiations produce a consensus. 
By reintroducing the possibility for defendants, assisted by a minority of 
WTO members, to block the adoption of panel and Appellate Body reports, 
                                                                                                                      
 162. See General Council, Procedures for the Appointment of Directors-General ¶ 20, U.N. 
Doc. WT/L/509 (Dec. 10, 2000) (stating that in the event no consensus can be reached by the dead-
line, “[m]embers should consider the possibility of recourse to a vote as a last resort by a procedure 
to be determined at that time”). 
 163. See Ehlermann & Ehring, supra note 74, at 13. See generally, Eric J. Pan, Authoritative 
Interpretations of Agreements: Developing More Responsive International Administrative Regimes, 
38 Harv. Int’l L. J. 503 (1997). 
 164. Barfield, supra note 17, at 7. 
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Barfield would obviously increase the options for WTO members to exit 
from their WTO obligations. Hence the situation of his proposal at Point 2 
in Chart 2 above (“Veto in Dispute Process”). Moreover, through the lens of 
the law-and-politics curve, less law or discipline (reintroduction of vetoes in 
the dispute process) would, indeed, reduce the need for politics and voice 
and ought to lead to a more efficient rulemaking process; once WTO Mem-
bers experience that the law they create is softer, they are more likely to 
agree to the creation of new law. Hence, the political process of rulemaking 
is likely to become more efficient: softer law leads to softer law-making; 
less discipline requires less participation. 
Granted, therefore, that less discipline or law may lead to a smoother 
decisionmaking process and facilitate legislative correction of the Appellate 
Body—Barfield’s main objective—the reform has one major flaw: it 
overlooks almost 100 years of trade history. This history, as recounted in 
Part I, tells us that through a process of trial and error, it was discovered that 
for the world trade system to be effective, in particular once it started 
addressing more elusive nontariff barriers, it had to be coupled with an 
independent and automatic enforcement mechanism. Softer forms of 
mediation or consultations alone would not do. In other words, for the 
political consensus to stick and, in particular, for trade liberalization to 
materialize in the face of domestic pressures for protectionism, the rules of 
the game had to be backed up by a strong legal-normative system. Similar to 
proposals for a wholesale reintroduction of representative politics in the 
world trade system165 (depicted at Point 3 in Chart 2 above, “Representative 
Politics”), reintroducing vetoes in the dispute process overlooks the need for 
precommitment and discipline to tame the protectionist excesses of 
representative politics.166 Without such hand-tying, the WTO would soon be 
ineffective and fail to fulfill its crucially important mandate of welfare-
enhancing trade liberalization.167 Hence the situation, in Chart 2 above, of 
both the proposal for a veto in the dispute process (Point 2) and a wholesale 
reintroduction of representative politics (Point 3) to the left of the law-and-
politics curve with the risk of an “ineffective” regime or loyalty without 
efficiency. Over time, both Points 2 and 3 would be drawn back to the 
equilibrium of the diagonal curve, yet, at the bottom of that curve, slightly 
above GATT 47, as a political veto in the dispute process would inevitably 
lead to lower levels of actual integration. 
The experience of the Great Depression and World War II prompted 
GATT negotiators to go beyond the lofty rhetoric of political declarations 
and to agree to more specific, legally binding commitments in 1947. The 
                                                                                                                      
 165. See sources cited supra note 127 and, to a lesser degree, Howse, supra note 26. 
 166. See supra note 11. 
 167. See George W. Downs et al., Is the Good News about Compliance Good News About 
Cooperation?, 50 Int’l Org. 379, 395–97 (noting that “deeper” international cooperation that 
requires more extensive changes to domestic laws and practices requires a strong monitoring and 
enforcement mechanism). 
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forty-seven years of operation of GATT have one recurring theme: the grad-
ual independence of the dispute resolution mechanism spurred by the 
realization that without strong normative pull trade liberalization will not 
materialize. This was painfully experienced, in particular, in the 1960s and 
1970s, when many GATT rules were simply put aside and the entire trade 
system almost collapsed. The need for a strong enforcement mechanism was 
again felt in the years leading to the Uruguay Round, when a combination of 
exit pressures—ranging from the blocking of panel reports to the conclusion 
of regional trade deals and U.S. unilateralism—seriously undermined the 
world trade system.168 Indeed, it was exactly the type of mechanism that 
Barfield now proposes—the possibility for countries to block dispute set-
tlement—that triggered U.S. unilateralism and necessitated the DSU 
reforms, including the setting aside of vetoes. Without those DSU reforms, 
the United States, in particular, would not have signed off on the WTO 
treaty.169 
Whilst reintroducing political vetoes in the dispute process would, there-
fore, be “a regression towards some of the very important problems in the 
GATT era”170 and risk an ineffective world trade regime, a better solution to 
alleviate Barfield-type fears—fears that the WTO judiciary acts ultra vires—
consists of two steps. First, we must value the need for, and legitimizing 
                                                                                                                      
 168. Although the GATT dispute process with vetoes worked reasonably well (according to 
Robert Hudec, for example, eighty percent of all GATT cases were resolved in a satisfactory man-
ner, see Hudec, Evolution, supra note 64; Robert Hudec et al., A Statistical Profile of GATT 
Dispute Settlement Cases: 1948–1989, 2 Minn. J. Global Trade 1, 32–34 (1993)), this success is 
relative and not guaranteed in the context of the WTO. First, it is relative because the GATT figures 
do not include those disputes that members never bothered to raise formally because they knew that 
the process would be blocked. Second, and more importantly, the relative success of the GATT 
system with vetoes is unlikely to transpose to the much broader and deeper commitments made in 
the new WTO treaty. WTO commitments go well beyond tariff questions and impose disciplines in 
far more sensitive areas (such as health, safety, services trade, and intellectual property protection). 
When faced with complaints in those fields, WTO members would be much more inclined to use 
their vetoes, thereby risking the paralysis of the entire process. This was apparent already in the late 
1980s and early 1990s when, according to Hudec’s own statistics, forty percent of disputes were 
blocked, especially those involving nontariff barriers (such as the Report of the Appellate Body, EC 
Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), U.N. Doc. WT/DS26/AB/R (Jan. 16, 
1998)), reaching the point of undermining the entire dispute process. Hence, in the context of the 
WTO, a system with vetoes is most likely to be far less successful than it has been under GATT. In 
2002, Hudec himself rejected Barfield’s proposal to allow a substantial minority to block any legal 
ruling: “I feel certain that governments would never be able to employ such a blocking power objec-
tively. It would become a political filter for all legal rulings, pure and simple. . . . [I]t would 
probably leave the WTO legal system in the unflattering position of the spider’s web that catches 
only middle-sized flies.” Hudec, supra note 1, at 222. 
 169. It is, therefore, no small irony that it is exactly the United States that recently espoused 
Barfield-type reforms. Faced with a number of losses in WTO dispute settlement, the United States 
proposed to permit the partial adoption of dispute rulings by the DSB, in case the parties disagree 
with a particular finding. See Negotiations on Improvements and Clarifications of the DSU on Im-
proving Flexibility and Member Control in WTO Dispute Settlement, Contribution by Chile and the 
United States, U.N. Doc. TN/DSW/28 (Dec. 23 2002). In the process, much like Barfield himself, 
the United States seems to have forgotten about the original reasons why it pushed so hard for DSU 
automaticity in the first place: foot-dragging and blocking by the E.C. and other GATT parties, 
threatening support for trade liberalization at home. 
 170. Sutherland Report, supra note 18, at 56. 
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factor of, a rigorous, rules-based judiciary at the international level as much 
as we do domestically, and forget the illusion that decisionmaking by repre-
sentative democracy is inherently and always better than by judiciary.171 That 
is what separation of powers or checks and balances is all about. The judici-
ary needs political control as much as politics needs judicial implementation 
and oversight. Or do we want, or even trust, for example, the U.S Congress 
to decide each and every civil dispute or murder trial?172 
Second, we need to think creatively about legislative checks and bal-
ances on the WTO judiciary other than the nuclear option of vetoes in the 
dispute process.173 The DSU itself includes a powerful warning against judi-
cial activism: It explicitly prohibits panels and the Appellate Body to “add 
to or diminish the rights and obligations” of WTO members.174 Another 
form of political checks and balances is the control, or at least the sense of 
control, given to disputing parties over who will serve on a panel and the 
Appellate Body.175 In most cases, panel members are appointed with the 
agreement of both parties.176 Appellate Body members, in turn, can only be 
appointed, and after four years need to be reappointed, by consensus of all 
WTO Members.177 This control must be maintained.178 Also during  
                                                                                                                      
 171. See supra note 11 (discussing the need to restrict discretionary powers of governments 
because of the so-called time consistency problem). 
 172. Equally, the possibility of (a minority of) individual WTO members blocking the dispute 
process would seriously taint the objectivity and legal quality of dispute rulings. As happened in the 
GATT days, when panels operated in the shadow of a veto, WTO panels would again have to take 
up a political role and craft their decisions in such a way that they would pass muster with the re-
quired majority of WTO members. The adoption process, as well, would inevitably lead to power 
games and nasty political infighting, bargaining, and trade-offs (of the sort, “I support blocking your 
ruling if you support blocking mine”). This combination of factors would bring into question the 
foundations of the WTO normative structure (“why should I comply with a ruling if you refuse to do 
so?”) and with it the effectiveness and legitimacy of the world trade regime itself. 
 173. See Tom Ginsburg, Abstract, International Judicial Lawmaking, (Illinois Law and 
Economics, Working Paper No. LE05-006, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=693861 
(“While formal mechanisms to over-rule international judges are relatively difficult to exercise, 
states have at their disposal various informal mechanisms to communicate their views to judges.”). 
 174. DSU, supra note 4, art. 3.2, 19.2. 
 175. The importance of this control is confirmed, for example, in Andy Stoler, The WTO 
Dispute Settlement Process: Did We Get What Negotiators Wanted? (May 2003) (unpublished 
manuscript, presented at the Dartmouth-Tuck Forum on International Trade and Business, Managing 
Global Trade: The WTO—Trade Remedies and Dispute Settlement), available at http:// 
mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/cib/news/dtf_2003_pdf/Stoler.pdf (last visited Aug. 2, 2005). 
 176. DSU, supra note 4, art. 8.9 provides, however, that in the absence of agreement between 
the parties who will serve on a panel, either party can request the WTO Director-General to appoint 
the panelists. 
 177. See id. arts. 2.4, 17.2. 
 178. Equally important as a political check are the de facto reservation of U.S., E.C., and 
Japanese seats on the Appellate Body with the other four seats rotating on a geographical basis and 
the practice that even nationals of a disputing party can sit on an Appellate Body division. For a 
controversial defense of what is somewhat misleadingly referred to as “dependent” judiciaries over 
“independent” ones (dependency being defined “in the sense that the judges are appointed by the 
state parties for the purpose of resolving a particular dispute”), see Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, A 
Theory of International Adjudication, 93 Cal. L. Rev. 1, 3 (2005). 
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dispute proceedings, common judicial techniques can accommodate and 
respond to political sensitivities such as open hearings and increased trans-
parency, deference, judicial minimalism, putting the burden of proving an 
obligation on the complainant, and even declaring a non liquet.179 In addi-
tion, the political control that the DSB currently exercises over dispute 
settlement ought not be underestimated. As the umbilical cord between the 
political and judicial branch, it is a crucial interface and forum of contesta-
tion or voice to which both panels and the Appellate Body are most 
receptive. The outcry in the DSB against the Appellate Body’s acceptance of 
amicus curiae briefs in the E.C.—Asbestos dispute offers a good example.180 
Ever since, the Appellate Body has not drawn information from such briefs 
even if they were formally accepted, and a number of panels even refused 
outright to accept amicus briefs.181 This confirms a broader avenue for  
political control, or at least political responsiveness, in that courts, including 
in particular the WTO Appellate Body, have clear incentives to act with re-
straint, cognizant of their political context and perceived legitimacy. To 
garnish legitimacy and ensure implementation of their rulings—after all, the 
ultimate test of their power—Appellate Body members are “eager to avoid 
adverse political responses by WTO member states.”182 More than formal 
controls, it is those considerations of legitimacy and effectiveness that over 
time will keep the WTO judiciary in check with the WTO political branch. 
Finally, as pointed out earlier, authoritative interpretations correcting 
dispute rulings remain a possibility for formal legislative correction and, at 
least on the books, require a mere three-fourths majority. As elaborated be-
low, resisting the temptation of ever more legalization, including the 
temptation of judicial activism and a strict rule of precedent, and maintain-
ing crucial exit options such as meaningful escape clauses and relatively 
weak remedies would take some steam off the judicial branch. This, in turn, 
should facilitate political consensus building and legislative correction, and 
could even make three-fourths majority interpretations digestible. Equally, 
more participation and contestation in WTO affairs as suggested below, that 
                                                                                                                      
 179. See Bartels, supra note 113; William J. Davey, Has the WTO Dispute Settlement System 
Exceeded Its Authority?, 4 J. Int’l Econ. L. 79 (2001); Jeffrey Dunoff, The Death of the Trade 
Regime, 10 Eur. J. Int’l L. 756 (1999); J. Patrick Kelly, Judicial Activism at the WTO: Developing 
Principles of Self-Restraint, 22 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 353 (2002); see also Hudec, supra note 1, at 
215, 219 (“Courts do have legal tools that permit them to deflect pressures to legislate . . . . [T]he 
best option at the present time would be to continue dealing with the problem cases as they come, 
under the present DSU rules, subject to whatever technical improvements governments may agree 
to.”). See generally Cass R. Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on the Su-
preme Court (1999).  
 180.  General Council, Minutes of Meeting, U.N. Doc. WT/GC/60 (Nov. 22, 2000). 
 181. See, e.g., Panel Report, United States—Final Countervailing Duty Determination with 
Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada, at 71 n.75, U.N. Doc. WT/DS257/R (Feb. 17, 
2004); Panel Report, United States—Investigation of the International Trade Commission in Soft-
wood Lumber from Canada, at 88 n.75, U.N. Doc. WT/DS277/R (Apr. 26 2005). 
 182. James McCall Smith, WTO Dispute Settlement: The Politics of Procedure in Appellate Body 
Rulings, 2 World Trade Rev. 64, 75 (2003); see also Steinberg, supra note 19. 
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is more politics, should help avoid overreaching by the Appellate Body and 
lay a broader basis of support for its rulings. 
3. Further Legalize/Depoliticize the WTO 
A third group of commentators focuses its attention on further 
improving the legal-normative branch of the WTO (see Chart 2 above, 
Point 4: “More Legalization/Depoliticization”). Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, 
for example, is a strong advocate of further constitutionalization of the 
WTO. He construes WTO rights and obligations as individual human 
rights and at the domestic level would give direct effect to those rights 
before domestic courts.183 In various ways and degrees, Cottier (direct 
effect of WTO rules before domestic courts),184 Weiler (ending the 
diplomatic remnants of dispute settlement in favor of a more openly 
legalized approach),185 Ragosta (standing for private parties under the 
DSU),186 Bhala (calling for a de jure rule of precedent),187 and Horlick and 
Mavroidis (tougher remedies)188 have also advocated a further thickening of 
the WTO legal system. Authors expressing support for judicial activism or 
constitutionalization through Appellate Body rulings fall under the same 
category.189 In a more sweeping theory, McGinnis and Movsesian endorse 
WTO adjudicative power but warn against any attempt to draw the WTO 
into the politics of nontrade concerns.190 In their view, depoliticization or 
separation of trade law from domestic and international politics is not so 
much a problem. Rather it is the very purpose of the WTO and a 
prerequisite to economic liberalization. 
a. The Risks and Illusions of Further Legalization. How would this 
harder law approach—if implemented in isolation—play out under the law-
                                                                                                                      
 183. See, e.g., Petersmann, supra note 14; Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Time for a United Nations 
‘Global Compact’ for Integrating Human Rights into the Law of Worldwide Organizations: Lessons 
from European Integration, 13 Eur. J. Int’l L. 621 (2002). 
 184. Thomas Cottier & Krista Nadakavukaren Schefer, The Relationship between World Trade 
Organization Law, National and Regional Law, 1 J. Int’l Econ. L. 83 (1998). 
 185. J.H.H. Weiler, The Rule of Lawyers and the Ethos of Diplomats: Reflections on the Internal 
and External Legitimacy of WTO Dispute Settlement, 35 J. World Trade 191 (2001). 
 186. Ragosta, supra note 20. 
 187. Raj Bhala, The Power of the Past: Towards De Jure Stare Decisis in WTO Adjudication 
(Part Three of a Trilogy), 33 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. 873 (2001). 
 188. Gary N. Horlick, Problems With the Compliance Structure of the WTO Dispute Resolu-
tion Process, in The Political Economy of International Trade Law 636 (Daniel Kennedy & 
James Southwick eds., 2002); Petros C. Mavroidis, Remedies in the WTO Legal System: Between a 
Rock and a Hard Place, 11 Eur. J. Int’l L. 763 (2000). 
 189. See Deborah Z. Cass, The ‘Constitutionalization’ of International Trade Law: Judicial 
Norm-Generation as the Engine of Constitutional Development in International Trade, 12 Eur. J. 
Int’l L. 39 (2001); Joanne Scott, International Trade and Environmental Governance: Relating 
Rules (and Standards) in the EU and the WTO, 15 Eur. J. Int’l L. 307 (2004) (calling for the Ap-
pellate Body to review the validity of international standards enacted by other organizations to 
stimulate much-needed reform in those organizations). 
 190. McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 10. 
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and-politics curve? To begin with, further legalization would only worsen 
the current asymmetry between the judicial and the political branch. Judicial 
activism by the Appellate Body, in particular, risks lawmaking with almost 
no voice, participation, or guidance from WTO members. Under the law-
and-politics curve, in a politically sensitive organization like the WTO, such 
activism, although it may trigger short-term liberalization and predictability 
gains, would not be sustainable: more discipline or law requires more, not 
less, participation and politics.191 Indeed, if a choice had to be made between 
judicial lawmaking and voting by qualified majority—the softer lawmaking 
proposal discussed earlier—the latter may well be the least of two evils. 
This was exactly one of the reasons used to sell majority voting in the E.C., 
in the wake of judicial activism by the ECJ.192 Conversely, knowing that le-
galization or increased discipline unequivocally calls for more politics and 
expression of voice or participation, the harder law solution would only 
worsen, not resolve, the current deadlock in the political, rulemaking proc-
ess: countries would insist even more on their veto rights. Moreover, since 
harder law or more discipline cannot be sustained without more political 
support or more politics, it is highly questionable, as things stand today, that 
sufficient political support—be it at the state or broader societal level—is 
available to make such further legalization digestible.193 In this context, fur-
ther legalizing the WTO is, in the medium to long term, unlikely to offer 
tangible gains in trade liberalization.194 It risks rather serious pressure on the 
exit side: even under increased legalization, WTO members, especially the 
most powerful ones, could walk away from their obligations. This, in turn, 
may undermine, rather than strengthen, the legitimacy and effectiveness of 
the trade regime. Hence the situation of this proposal in Chart 2 above at 
Point 4 (“More Legalization/Depoliticization”), deviating to the right of the 
law-and-politics curve with the risk of an “unsupported” regime or effi-
ciency without loyalty. As with the other reform proposals, the expected 
                                                                                                                      
 191. Given the consensus rule, and the need to keep it for the time being, the WTO judiciary 
cannot afford to be as activist as, for example, the ECJ. The ECJ could, for instance, extend the list 
of Article 30 E.C. Treaty exceptions (similar to GATT Article XX) as well as more easily strike 
down member state measures since it knew that E.C. member states acting jointly could respond and 
enact secondary legislation such as an E.C.-wide environmental regulation that no longer restricts 
intra-Community trade but takes account of the concern originally expressed in the condemned 
member state measure. The WTO does not have similar legislative powers. 
 192. See Koen Lenaerts, Some Thoughts about the Interaction Between Judges and Politi-
cians, 1992 U. Chi. Legal F. 93, 111 (1992); Peter L. Lindseth, Democratic Legitimacy and the 
Administrative Character of Supranationalism: The Example of the European Community, 99 
Colum. L. Rev. 628, 633 (1999). 
 193. See Goldstein et al., supra note 2, at 391 (referring to “misguided attempts to construct a 
stable order on the basis of fragile norms rather than realities of power politics”); see also Laurence 
Helfer, Overlegalizing Human Rights: International Relations Theory and the Commonwealth Car-
ibbean Backlash against Human Rights Regimes, 102 Colum. L. Rev. 1832 (2002). 
 194. See Judith Goldstein & Lisa L. Martin, Legalization, Trade Liberalization, and Domestic 
Politics: A Cautionary Note, 54 Int’l Org. 603 (2000); Joost Pauwelyn, The Limits of Litigation: 
Americanization and Negotiation in the Settlement of WTO Disputes, 19 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Re-
sol. 121 (2003); Amelia Porges, Settling WTO Disputes: What Do Litigation Models Tell Us? 19 
Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 141 (2003). 
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equilibrium would soon be reestablished, yet, at a much lower level of inte-
gration along the diagonal curve, somewhere between GATT 47 and WTO 
94. 
In each stage of the transformation of the world trade system, the main-
tenance of, or even selective increase in, exit options was an absolute 
precondition for reaching consensus and concluding new agreements. As 
pointed out, without broad exceptions and multiple escape clauses such as 
safeguards, tariff renegotiations, waivers, and weak remedies, the original 
GATT could not have been concluded. Equally, the Tokyo Round agree-
ments would not have been finalized but for certain exit options; in 
particular, the à la carte nature of the Tokyo Round Codes on nontariff barri-
ers and the exclusion of GATT developing countries from both new and 
existing GATT disciplines through, for example, the Enabling Clause.195 The 
successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round, as well, required the confir-
mation of certain exit options. Notwithstanding the general thickening of the 
WTO legal structure, GATT’s original safety valves were maintained, some 
were even expanded,196 and most of them were also transposed to new WTO 
agreements on trade in goods, GATS, and TRIPS.197 Moreover, the remedies 
to counter violations under the streamlined DSU remained as weak as those 
in GATT Article XXIII: no reparation for past damage is awarded, compen-
sation for ongoing harm is still subject to agreement between the parties, 
and a reciprocal suspension of concessions—which, after all, is just another 
form of exit—remains the measure of last resort. On the contrary, in at least 
one respect, WTO remedies were actually weakened: the DSU reduced the 
scope for retaliation from suspension as determined “to be appropriate in the 
circumstances”198 to suspension “equivalent to the level of the nullification 
or impairment” caused by the original violation.199 
                                                                                                                      
 195. See supra note 73. 
 196. Reservations to renegotiate tariff concessions pursuant to GATT Article XXVIII:5 (i.e., 
outside the three year interval and without authorization) increased as GATT evolved into the WTO. 
For the period between 1994 and 1996, more such reservations (thirty-seven in total) were made 
than in any other period (compare to four in the period 1958–1960). See Anwarul Hoda, Tariff 
Negotiations and Renegotiations under the GATT and the WTO: Procedures and Prac-
tices 89 (2001). 
 197. See the broad substantive exceptions in, for example, GATS, supra note 7, art. XIV, 
TRIPS, supra note 7, art. 13, and TBT, supra note 7, art. 2.2. Based on GATT art. XXVIII (tariff 
renegotiations), GATS permits members to renegotiate GATS specific commitments. GATS, supra 
note 7, art. XXI. GATS also calls for the consideration of a safeguards mechanism for trade in ser-
vices, GATS, supra note 7, art. X, but none has been introduced yet. As it stands, however, GATS 
already includes a series of built-in safeguards (e.g. unlike GATT art. III, there is no general obliga-
tion under GATS to provide national treatment; according to GATS art. XVII, this obligation is only 
triggered to the extent a member has made a specific commitment). Finally, waivers under art. IX of 
the WTO Charter apply across all WTO agreements including GATS and TRIPS. 
 198. GATT, supra note 5, art. XXIII:2. 
 199. DSU, supra note 4, art. 22.4. While the old GATT rule left open, at least in theory, the 
possibility for punitive sanctions, the new DSU provision limits suspension to equivalence to the 
harm caused. See also WTO Agreement, supra note 3, Prohibited Subsidies, art. 4.10 n.9, 1869 
U.N.T.S. 17 (permitting “appropriate countermeasures” but clarifying that “[t]his expression is not 
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Given the uncertainties of the future, both political and economic, nego-
tiators needed these exit options as safety valves.200 Rather than birth defects 
that must be cured as soon as possible through ever more legalization, my 
claim is that those exit options were, and remain, crucial preconditions for 
trade deals to stick. Without them, the breadth and depth of substantive 
WTO commitments would not have materialized. Similarly, weak remedies 
were a crucial precondition for the otherwise strengthened WTO dispute 
process. Knowing that they could no longer block dispute rulings, WTO 
members were eager to limit the remedies or sanctions that would follow 
any WTO condemnation.201 To drastically reduce or eliminate those exit op-
tions, that is, to further legalize the WTO—without countervailing increases 
in participation, loyalty, and support for the WTO project—risks undermin-
ing the substantive commitment both to the WTO and to the DSU in 
particular. 
b. The Risks and Illusions of Depoliticization. Like further legalization, 
calls to transform WTO rules into immutable human rights or, more gener-
ally, to keep WTO affairs extracted from politics and nontrade concerns, 
would increase levels of discipline and precommitment. In addition, such 
calls would also move the system away from, rather than closer to, partici-
pation, democratic accountability, and contestation. Hence their depiction in 
Chart 2 above at Point 4. McGinnis and Mosvesian,202 for example, argue 
that the WTO must limit itself to antidiscrimination principles and avoid 
dealing with nontrade concerns such as health or environmental protection, 
human rights or poverty. In their view, liberal trade, and hence the WTO, is 
inherently in the interest of the majority; it reinforces democracy by neutral-
izing protectionist interest groups at home. International efforts to address 
nontrade concerns, in contrast, must be avoided. They are necessarily cap-
tured by special interest groups aimed at skewing a decision in their favor, 
against majority welfare.203 
                                                                                                                      
meant to allow countermeasures that are disproportionate in light of the fact that the subsidies dealt 
with under these provisions are prohibited”). 
 200. See sources cited supra note 57; see also Richard B. Bilder, Managing the Risks of 
International Agreement 219–221 (1981) (referring to exit options in treaties as “Risk-
Management Techniques”); B. Peter Rosendorff & Helen V. Milner, The Optimal Design of Interna-
tional Trade Institutions: Uncertainty and Escape, 55 Int’l Org. 829, 831 (2001). 
 201. Along the same lines, the United States, for the first time since the creation of GATT in 
1947, made it explicit that WTO rules could not have direct effect before domestic U.S. courts. See 
Uruguay Round Agreements Act, 19 U.S.C. § 3512 (1994). A similar provision is provided in E.C. 
implementing legislation. See Case C-149/96, Portuguese Republic v. Council, 1999 E.C.R. I-8395. 
Before 1995, the question of the effect of GATT in domestic U.S. law remained unresolved. See 
Ronald Brand, The Status of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in United States Domestic 
Law, 26 Stan. J. Int’l L. 479, 507 (1990). 
 202. See McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 10. 
 203. Id. at 557 (rejecting international regulation other than the WTO’s antidiscrimination 
model since “concentrated interest groups . . . will be able to exercise substantial influence to bring 
about policies that serve their interests, rather than the public interest”); John O. McGinnis & Mark 
L. Movsesian, Against Global Governance in the WTO, 45 Harv. Int’l L.J. 353, 355 (2004) (argu-
ing that such “[r]egulatory bargains . . . are not as likely to be efficient in terms of nations’ true 
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This theory obscures that the WTO is as much about protectionism as it 
is about free trade. As one commentator observed, “[g]lobal economic rules 
are not written by Platonic rulers, or their present-day pretenders, academic 
economists. If WTO agreements were truly about ‘free trade,’ as their oppo-
nents like to point out, a single sentence would suffice: ‘There shall be free 
trade.’ ”204 The reality is that there is as much politics at the WTO, with spe-
cial interest groups clamoring for favors, as there is in domestic parliaments. 
Protectionist agreements such as those concerning agriculture, textiles, or 
antidumping, and agreements that favor one group of countries over another, 
such as TRIPS,205 illustrate that the WTO does not necessarily lead to free 
trade in favor of the majority, but represents a political deal brokered in the 
context of power and special interests. There is nothing inherently wrong 
about this, and even if so, little we can do about it. Nevertheless, to limit this 
political bargaining game at the WTO to producer/exporter interest groups, 
as McGinnis and Mosvesian suggest, on the ground that they are a proxy of 
majority welfare is effectively elevating one set of special interests above all 
others.206 Equally, to isolate the WTO from nontrade concerns—which, in 
any event, is necessarily a fiction207—puts one societal concern above all 
others. 
To this date, the world trade system remains focused primarily on non-
discrimination as opposed to economic efficiency and the protection of 
producer as opposed to consumer welfare.208 No matter how inefficient a 
regulation or trade policy is, or thus irrespective of consumer welfare, GATT 
permits it as long as it is (inefficiently) applied across the board to everyone, 
including foreign traders. From this perspective, the system neither avoids 
harmful cross-border externalities nor does it inherently protect domestic 
consumers. Both in the rules and exceptions that it sets up, such as equal 
competitive opportunities rather than efficient regulation, and major carve-
outs for textiles and agriculture, as well as the escape clauses it provides for, 
which are triggered each time by injury to domestic producers (not harm to 
                                                                                                                      
preferences . . . . [They] are more likely to represent ‘amoral’ wealth transfers among different 
groups of citizens.”). 
 204. Dani Rodrik, Feasible Globalizations 19 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
Paper No. 9129, 2002), available at http://papers.nber.org/papers/w9129.pdf. 
 205. See Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of 
International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 Yale J. Int'l L. 1, 320–24 (2004) (explaining 
differential effect of TRIPS on superpowers versus developing countries). 
 206. See, e.g., Benvenisti, supra note 36; Keohane & Nye, supra note 119; Chantal Thomas, 
Challenges for Democracy and Trade: The Case of the United States, 41 Harv. J. on Legis. 1, 8 
(2004). 
 207. To exclude nontrade concerns from the WTO debate is a fiction. Even antidiscrimination 
principles require decisions on nontrade questions (e.g., to decide whether two products are alike or 
whether a discrimination can be justified, for example, by health concerns). See Kal Raustiala, Sov-
ereignty and Multilateralism, 1 Chi. J. Int'l L. 401, 404–07 (2000). In the end, therefore, McGinnis 
and Mosvesian’s theory will either lead to very minimal liberalization (since it would discipline only 
discrimination that does not involve nontrade concerns) or lead to lopsided outcomes where trade 
always trumps other preferences. 
 208. See sources cited supra note 35. 
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consumers), the system was created and continues to operate at the behest of 
producers. It is wed as much to liberal trade as protecting existing produc-
ers. Instead of inherently protecting the majority, the trade system, thereby, 
risks elevating special, that is, producer, interests above consumer concerns 
and beyond the control of domestic politics.209 It imposes a double standard 
to arbitrarily bind governments to any WTO rule because it is supposed to 
increase economic welfare, which in many cases is not true, and to reject 
international law in nontrade fields because it must be tainted by special 
interests. Both processes are intensely political and both need more, rather 
than less, participation, accountability, and contestation. Equally, both need 
safeguards against abuse by special interest groups and to ensure fair treat-
ment of weaker countries. 
The risk of exploitation by special interests at the WTO is further in-
creased by a general lack of domestic control, especially by national 
parliaments, over a country’s trade policy.210 Moreover, once member-states 
conclude a WTO agreement—unlike domestic law, including domestic con-
stitutions—any one particular WTO member cannot change the agreement, 
even by special or supermajority of its population. This immutability of trea-
ties is, of course, all the more worrying in the context of an international 
regime, like the WTO, where its rules and decisions matter and have real 
consequences.211 As a result, rather than increasing discipline and precom-
mitment, giving us more law, or depoliticizing the WTO, giving us less 
politics, the trade regime requires certain exit options such as escape clauses 
and flexible remedies and needs more, not less, space for politics, participa-
tion, and contestation. This includes more control by domestic politics, 
democratic safety valves, and counterweight of international agreements on 
nontrade concerns. If the WTO is to survive as a legitimate institution that 
effectively liberalizes trade it will need the direct support of consumers and 
citizens. Until now, export-driven, producer interests with allegedly only ma-
jority interests in mind have dominated the agenda at the WTO, effectively 
                                                                                                                      
 209. See Benvenisti, supra note 36. 
 210. See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Challenges to the Legitimacy and Efficiency of the World 
Trading System: Democratic Governance and Competition Culture in the WTO, 7 J. Int’l Econ. L. 
585, 589 (2004); Thomas, supra note 206, at 25. 
 211. Robert Howse, How to Begin to Think About the ‘Democratic Deficit’ at the WTO, in 
International Economic Governance and Non-Economic Concerns 79, 94 (Stefan Griller 
ed., Eur. Cmty. Stud. Assoc. Aus. Publ’n Series Vol. 5, 2003) (“[T]hese costs of and constraints on 
reversibility, combined with the impact of new era trade rules in freezing or limiting regulatory 
choices in many policy areas . . . constitute the most troubling aspect of the WTO’s ‘democratic 
deficit’.”). This combination of factors led Weiler and Motoc to the following conclusion: “You take 
the obedience claim of International Law and couple it with the conflation of government and State 
which International Law posits and you get nothing more than a monstrous empowerment of the 
executive branch at the expense of other political estates.” J.H.H. Weiler & Iulia Motoc, Taking 
Democracy Seriously: The Normative Challenges to the International Legal System, in Interna-
tional Economic Governance and Non-Economic Concerns 47, 67 (Stefan Griller ed., Eur. 
Cmty. Stud. Assoc. Aus. Publ’n Series Vol. 5, 2003); see also Armin von Bogdandy, Legitimacy of 
International Economic Governance: Interpretative Approaches to WTO Law and the Prospects of 
Its Proceduralization, in International Economic Governance and Non-Economic Concerns 
103, 107 (Stefan Griller ed., Eur. Cmty. Stud. Assoc. Aus. Publ’n Series Vol. 5, 2003). 
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isolating the issues from a broader political debate; this will no longer suf-
fice. 
B. A Better Framework for Reform 
The core message of the previous Section is that current proposals for 
WTO reform are focused exclusively on either the politics pole, such as get-
ting rid of the consensus rule, or the law pole, such as reverting to old GATT 
practices or, in contrast, further legalization/depoliticization. Conventional 
suggestions for reform do not take sufficient account of the interaction be-
tween law and politics: in particular, the fact that any change on one side 
calls for a reaction on the other. This law-and-politics, exit-and-voice bal-
ance is in constant flux and under constant threat. A minute alteration on one 
side can change the balance the way pulling out one brick at one end of a 
building can cause major cracks on the other end, and even the demise of 
the entire construction. A better framework for reform realizes the fluid 
equilibrium between law and politics, discipline and participation, and the 
bidirectional relationship that brings it about. Although my line of reasoning 
could stop here, and a variety of equilibria between the two poles are possi-
ble,212 the final Section of this Article does venture into a particular set of 
reforms that would, in my view, improve the legitimacy and effectiveness of 
the world trade system. 
To remedy the WTO’s problems—lack of input and output legitimacy—
my claim is that the WTO needs more, not less, politics and participation of 
individual members and nonstate actors; and more, not less, control by do-
mestic politics and consideration of nontrade concerns. Moreover, it must 
maintain, not eliminate, the possibility for exit especially when supported by 
consumer welfare or democratic decision. Depicted in Chart 2 above, my 
reform package is therefore situated at Point 5 (“Suggested Reform”): sig-
nificantly more participation and politics and slightly less discipline or law 
as compared to the present system. 
Importantly, when implemented with care, the increase in politics and 
participation ought not deadlock the political process; nor should maintain-
ing certain exit options undermine the WTO’s normative structure. On the 
contrary, the mere availability of certain exit options, such as safeguards or 
temporary compensation/suspension in the event of violation, should facili-
tate reaching a political consensus and thus make rulemaking more efficient. 
Equally, stronger outlets for voice and participation—more politics and 
hence more support for WTO rules—should increase the legitimacy of the 
trade system, strengthen the support for and effectiveness of the DSU, and 
eventually reduce pressure on the exit option. Coming full circle, this re-
duced pressure to exit because of higher levels of support would mean that 
                                                                                                                      
 212. Examining a very specific reform proposal in isolation, one could, for example, impose 
stricter remedies in the DSU; that is, further reduce exit, but make it possible—or, reestablish the 
equilibrium—by offering more voice or participation through public panel meetings and/or increas-
ing exit elsewhere through explicitly denying direct effect of WTO law in domestic courts. 
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the flexibility or exit options built into the system would be used only in 
exceptional circumstances.213 They would, in other words, strengthen, not 
undermine, the credibility of the WTO. 
1. More Politics, Participation, and Contestation 
Rather than decrease politics and participation—as some have sug-
gested, for example, by getting rid of the WTO consensus rule or 
depoliticizing WTO affairs—I suggest broadening the space for political 
debate and contestation. For the world trade system to be legitimate and 
sustainable, especially with a strong normative structure, more, not less, 
politics are needed.214 In large part because of its foundational mechanics to 
overcome protectionism by insulating export-interests from domestic poli-
tics, the world trade system remains too technocratic and too isolated from 
popular support. To increase participation and support, the consensus rule 
must be maintained215 but the participation of individual WTO members as 
well as nonstate actors increased. The role consensus plays in the internal 
and external legitimacy of the world trade system largely compensates for 
the delay and lourdeur in WTO decisionmaking, as well as for the some-
times limited outcome in trade negotiations.216 The so-called bicycle club of 
trade must be disbanded. It takes exporters and producers as the core con-
stituency of the system and assumes that, to keep their support, the world 
trade system requires ever more liberalization; otherwise, the bicycle will 
fall over. To survive as a legitimate organization, the WTO must extend its 
base to include consumers and citizens. It must, in other words, play out its 
strongest card: that genuine free trade benefits the masses, not the few. Now 
that those majority groups are increasingly better organized, be it in the po-
litical process or through NGOs, their voices must be heard directly. The 
                                                                                                                      
 213. Another example of this is the increase, with the creation of the WTO, in reservations to 
renegotiate tariff concessions pursuant to GATT art. XXVIII:5. See supra note 196. This increase in 
reservations or potential exit options, however, did not result in more actual renegotiations taking 
place. On the contrary, during the period 1995–1999, the lowest number of tariff renegotiations 
actually took place (eight as opposed to, for example, fifty-six between 1980 and 1999). Hoda, 
supra note 196, at 88, 107. This shows that the mere existence of exit options can be enough and 
need not necessarily lead to more instances of actual exit. 
 214. See Thomas Cottier, Limits to International Trade: The Constitutional Challenge, 2000 
Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. 220, 221; Howse, supra note 26; Robert Howse & Kalypso Nicolaïdis, 
Legitimacy and Global Governance: Why Constitutionalizing the WTO is a Step Too Far, in Effi-
ciency, Equity, and Legitimacy: The Multilateral Trading System at the Millennium 
227, 248–49 (Roger B. Porter et al. eds., 2001); David Kennedy, The Forgotten Politics of Interna-
tional Governance, 2001 Eur. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 117, 124; von Bogdandy, supra note 19. 
 215. In support of the consensus rule, see supra Section II.A.1. 
 216. In terms of the trilemma introduced by Dani Rodrik—deep economic integration versus 
nation state versus democratic politics—limited economic integration or results in trade negotiations 
because of the consensus rule may well be the price to pay for placating concerns of state sover-
eignty and democracy. Rodrik, supra note 204, at 13–18; see also Markus Krajewski, Democratic 
Legitimacy and Constitutional Perspectives of WTO Law, 35 J. World Trade 167, 168 (2001); 
Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Mission Impossible: Resolving the WTO’s Trilemma 8 (unpublished manuscript, 
on file with the author). 
PAUWELLYN REDO.DOC 9/20/2005 9:12 AM 
58 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 104:1 
 
proxy of exporters/producers allegedly representing majority interests is no 
longer needed and can, in any event, no longer suffice. 
In practical terms, political reinforcement and higher levels of contesta-
tion could be achieved through more active and frequent participation of 
senior policymakers in Geneva-based discussions,217 obliging countries that 
plan to block a broad consensus to explain in writing why the matter is one 
of vital interest to them218 and implementing the currently dead letter rule 
that when consensus cannot be reached at a particular meeting, the matter 
must be transferred to the WTO’s General Council, thereby exposing con-
tentious issues to a more visible and political debate.219 Other ways to ensure 
participation and contestation in WTO decisionmaking include more trans-
parency in the process itself, such as public meetings, readily available and 
readable documents and position papers, and openness in the formation and 
membership of smaller informal groups that meet even before an issue is put 
on the WTO table.220 When it comes to developing countries, regional and 
issue groupings can strengthen their voice or participation, as is increasingly 
the case through, for example, the African Group; the Group of 20, mainly 
large developing countries; and the Group of 90, a broader cross-section of 
developing countries including in particular the poorest ones.221 In addition, 
more attention to developing countries as well as technical assistance from 
the rich world is needed to ensure that the poorest countries are at least rep-
resented at WTO meetings that affect them, and to clearly define what the 
interests of a given developing country are in a specific trade matter. Too 
often it is not so much that developing country interests are not sufficiently 
defended; it is that they are not sufficiently defined. 
Increased voice or participation by nonstate actors, such as NGOs, small 
businesses, the rural poor, and citizens at large, ought not focus so much on 
having a seat or microphone in WTO meetings (as useful as this may be),222 
nor does it require any explicit approval by WTO members. Given that the 
WTO matters and carries consequences, and exit from it has been signifi-
                                                                                                                      
 217. See Sutherland Report, supra note 18, at 70. 
 218. Id. at 64. 
 219. See Rule 33 of the respective Rules of Procedure of the subordinate Councils, Commit-
tees, and other bodies of the WTO, referred to in Ehlermann & Ehring, supra note 74, at 52. 
 220. See Markus Krajewski, From Green Room to Glass Room—Participation of 
Developing Countries and Internal Transparency in the WTO Decision-Making Process 
6–11 (2000); Jeffrey J. Schott & Jayashree Watal, Decision Making in the WTO, in The WTO Af-
ter Seattle 283, 285–89 (Jeffrey J. Schott ed., 2000). 
 221. Such groupings or coalitions need not be permanent and may, given the heterogeneous 
nature of the vast number of developing countries, depend on a particular issue. The changing coali-
tions that can be formed within the informal consensus process offer a distinct advantage over 
weighted voting, in which coalitions are fixed for all questions based on, for example, regional 
geography. 
 222. See, e.g., Daniel C. Esty, Non-Governmental Organizations at the World Trade Organiza-
tion: Cooperation, Competition, or Exclusion, 1 J. Int’l Econ. L. 123, 131 (1998); Gabrielle 
Marceau & Peter N. Pedersen, Is the WTO Open and Transparent?, 33 J. World Trade 5, 44–45 
(1999). 
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cantly reduced, state and nonstate actors alike are using the voice mecha-
nism and injecting politics in the debates, whether the WTO as an 
organization or its individual members like it or not. Voice is activated, for 
example, when citizens protest at WTO Ministerial Meetings, when NGOs 
issue reports or give interviews criticizing the TRIPS agreement or export 
subsidies in the rich world, or when business associations bash the latest 
WTO panel report.223 In other words, nonstate actors can and do influence 
the WTO political process even without a formal say or vote in WTO deci-
sionmaking. In fact, rather than NGOs and citizens needing the help or 
blessing of the WTO, for example through formal permission to attend 
WTO meetings, it is the WTO that needs the input and support of NGOs and 
citizens to implement and legitimize its activities.224 Crucially, the sounding 
board of NGOs is not limited to, or even most important in, Geneva. Al-
though NGOs have an important lobbying and information role to play at 
the WTO itself, adding social and expert legitimacy to the organization, 
their activity is even more crucial at the grass-roots level. They constitute a 
direct, transnational interface or voice mechanism through which citizens 
and consumers can transmit concerns and obtain information about WTO 
activities and decisions. To enable and foster these diverse forms of partici-
pation, contestation, and dissemination, the WTO itself must improve the 
transparency of its activities, including its dispute settlement process. To 
bring the WTO closer to the public, the creation of regional WTO offices 
must be considered. In addition, thought could be given to setting up a WTO 
inspection mechanism similar to that available in the World Bank and re-
gional development banks.225 
More voice or input ought finally be given to other international organi-
zations including those addressing nontrade concerns. Because of the 
strength of the WTO’s legal-normative structure, in particular its automatic 
dispute process, the WTO is too often portrayed, most recently in the Suth-
erland Report itself,226 as a set of rules that prevail over other international 
                                                                                                                      
 223. As Hirschman points out, voice is broader than formal input in decisionmaking. It can be 
equated with interest articulation and “is a far more ‘messy’ concept [than exit] because it can be 
graduated, all the way from faint grumbling to violent protest,” from contestation to kicking up a 
fuss. Hirschman, supra note 15, at 16. 
 224. See Steve Charnovitz, WTO Cosmopolitics, 34 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 299, 353 
(2002); Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 Yale L.J. 2347 (1991). 
 225. See Inspection Panel of the World Bank, World Bank, Accountability at the 
World Bank: The Inspection Panel 10 Years On (2003). A similar system for the WTO could 
increase its accountability in that it permits affected groups and individuals to challenge the 
substance of official WTO activities—such as technical cooperation—under the guidelines and rules 
of the WTO itself. 
 226. Sutherland Report, supra note 18, at 38 (“ ‘[C]onditionalities’ imposed by the IMF 
and World Bank should not only be supportive but consistent with WTO obligations.”); id. at 39 
(“The WTO legal system is part of the international legal system, but it is a lex specialis. This lex 
specialis, qua lex specialis cannot be changed from the outside by other international organizations 
that have different membership and different rules regarding the creation of rules.”). The latter 
statement is in direct contradiction of Articles 30 and 48 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
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law.227 Given the broad field and scope of the trade system—at least tangen-
tially affecting the protection of the environment, human rights, cultural 
diversity, etc.—this WTO “superiority complex” frequently takes other in-
ternational negotiations hostage.228 Both in its lawmaking and dispute 
settlement, the WTO must take account of activities and rules created else-
where, in particular those that the disputing parties themselves have 
consented to. This is not a call for the WTO itself to engage in environ-
mental or human rights lawmaking.229 Rather, let other organizations do this, 
but when such is done, the WTO, as a part of the broader international sys-
tem, must take cognizance and when appropriate defer to the rules agreed to 
in those other fora.230 WTO cooperation with other international rules and 
organizations is part and parcel of greater contestation and participation in 
the world trade system itself. No matter how elusive and messy, such coor-
dination between, for example, trade and human rights or environmental 
regimes “highlight[s] the contingency of the limits of individual regimes, 
their dependence on other regimes, and the politics of regime-definition.”231 
2. Slightly Reduce Discipline and Maintain 
and Clarify Exit Options 
The increase in politics, voice, and participation of both state and non-
state actors advocated above ought to offer a more solid basis of support for 
a strong WTO normative regime. Yet, to facilitate this messy voice mecha-
nism—in particular, consensus building and the varied avenues for input 
from nonstate actors—and to prevent deadlock in the political decisionmak-
ing process, it is important to keep certain exit options open and not to over-
legalize the system. With the assurance of exit in the worst-case scenario, 
WTO members will more easily join a political consensus to create new 
                                                                                                                      
Treaties addressing, respectively, the interaction between earlier and later treaties and inter se modi-
fications of multilateral treaties. 
 227. Keohane speaks of partial globalization. Robert O. Keohane, Power and Govern-
ance in a Partially Globalized World (2002). For Ruggie, a crucial element in the 
globalization backlash is “a growing imbalance in global rule making. Those rules that favor global 
market expansion have become more robust and enforceable . . . . But rules intended to promote 
equally valid social objectives, be they labor standards, human rights, environmental quality or 
poverty reduction, lag behind and in some instances actually have become weaker.” John Gerard 
Ruggie, Taking Embedded Liberalism Global: The Corporate Connection, in Taming Globaliza-
tion: Frontiers of Governance 93, 96–97 (David Held & Mathias Koenig-Archibugi eds., 
2003). 
 228. See Joost Pauwelyn, WTO Compassion or Superiority Complex? What to Make of the 
WTO Waiver for “Conflict Diamonds”, 24 Mich. J. Int’l L. 1177 (2003). 
 229. Contra Andrew T. Guzman, Global Governance and the WTO, 45 Harv. Int’l L.J. 303, 
307 (2004) (advocating that the WTO itself should negotiate treaties on nontrade concerns). 
 230. See Joost Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How 
WTO Law Relates to Other Rules of International Law 158–212 (2003). 
 231. Martti Koskenniemi, Global Legal Pluralism: Multiple Regimes and 
Multiple Modes of Thought 20 (2005), available at http://www.valt.helsinki.fi/blogs/eci/ 
PluralismHarvard.pdf. 
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rules. Crucially, limited exit options and slightly lower levels of discipline 
may offer important democratic safety valves and thereby respond to criti-
cisms of a WTO constitution-type construct that imposes free trade over and 
above anything else. In large part because of its foundational mechanics of 
overcoming protectionism by insulating export-interests from domestic poli-
tics, the world trade system risks being too rigid or legalized to respond to 
valid flexibility demands of representative politics and of other international 
regimes.232 Limited exit options, when combined with the suggested high 
levels of participation, would eventually not often be resorted to; given the 
high levels of participation in lawmaking and the other pressures felt 
through the voice mechanism, in particular from consumers and businesses 
in favor of free trade, countries ought only exercise these exit options in ex-
ceptional circumstances. In the end, therefore, rather than undermine the 
normative structure of the WTO, limited exit or somewhat lower levels of 
discipline—in tandem with higher levels of participation and politics—is the 
best recipe for an effective and legitimate world trade system. 
In practical terms, the WTO should relinquish its obsession with the sin-
gle-package idea.233 Given the huge diversity among WTO members, both in 
terms of economic development and noneconomic preferences, WTO 
agreements and rules ought not always be binding on all WTO members. With 
close to 150 members, differentiation or a multiple-speed WTO is unavoid-
able. Rather than force new commitments on unwilling countries through 
majority voting or block the entire process by insisting on consensus amongst 
all players, the system must recognize its diversity and tailormake its rules 
to its different constituencies. Even soft law, or political declarations or tar-
gets that are not legally binding, as an alternative to the usually hard WTO 
commitments could, in certain cases, be considered.234 The need for consen-
sus amongst all WTO members to add a plurilateral agreement to the WTO 
treaty, even if such agreement is binding only on some WTO members, must 
be revisited. Even within the E.U., with its far more homogeneous member-
ship, this strict requirement for differentiation no longer applies.235 Although 
some control by the entire WTO membership over new agreements is useful, 
for example to make sure that plurilateral agreements do not harm the rights 
of third parties, a single member ought not have a veto to block further 
WTO progress by others. 
In addition, the WTO must maintain its broad, substantive exceptions, 
tariff and other renegotiation provisions, waiver system, and safety valves in 
case of violation in the form of temporary compensation and suspension of 
                                                                                                                      
 232. See supra note 211. 
 233. Sutherland Report, supra note 18, at 65–66 (referring to “variable geometry”). 
 234. See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, International Action on Bribery and Corrup-
tion: Why the Dog Didn’t Bark in the WTO, in The Political Economy of International Trade 
Law 177 (Daniel Kennedy & James Southwick eds., 2002). 
 235. European Constitution, supra note 142, art. III-325, 2004 O.J. (C 310) 146–48; see 
Bruno De Witte et al., Introduction to The Many Faces of Differentiation in E.U. Law, at ix, ix 
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concessions. The scope for bilateral settlement of trade disputes and the 
conclusion of nontrade agreements in other international fora must be clari-
fied. Given that WTO obligations are not collective obligations binding erga 
omnes partes,236 settlements and non-WTO treaties in deviation of WTO 
rules must be accepted as permissible for as long as they do not affect the 
rights of third parties. 
In turn, safeguards remain an important safety valve under existing 
commitments and a crucial instrument in obtaining new commitments.237 
The Appellate Body, in contrast, has taken an openly unsympathetic stance 
against safeguards, calling them purely protectionist measures in response to 
fair trade, or a sudden increase in imports. It has contrasted safeguards, in 
particular, to antidumping measures, which it regards as a reaction to unfair 
trade in the form of dumped imports.238 As a result, the Appellate Body has 
strictly interpreted the conditions for safeguards and so far not found a sin-
gle safeguard measure to be in line with WTO rules.239 The Appellate Body’s 
strict interpretation of safeguards and rather loose approach to antidumping 
measures provides an incentive for WTO members to exploit the loopholes 
of the antidumping agreement. Unlike safeguards—which must, in princi-
ple, be imposed on all imports, offset only injury caused to the domestic 
industry and be compensated for, at least after three years, in some cases, as 
of their enactment—antidumping measures are subject to manipulation,240 
are discriminatory, offset the entire dumping margin—which is often higher 
than the injury caused—and must never be compensated for.241 Rather than 
inciting the use and abuse of antidumping, the Appellate Body should rec-
ognize the crucial role, transparency, and benefits linked to safeguards and 
promote safeguards over antidumping measures, or at least put them on an 
equal footing. 
At the same time, WTO contingency measures—safeguards, antidump-
ing duties, and countervailing duties to offset subsidies—focus exclusively 
                                                                                                                      
 236. See Joost Pauwelyn, A Typology of Multilateral Treaty Obligations: Are WTO Obliga-
tions Bilateral or Collective in Nature?, 14 Eur. J. Int’l L. 907 (2003). 
 237. See Claude E. Barfield, U.S. Steel Tariffs Gave Safeguards a Bad Name, Fin. Times, Dec. 
8, 2003, at 13 (U.S. ed.). 
 238. See Alan O. Sykes, The Safeguards Mess: A Critique of WTO Jurisprudence, 2 World 
Trade Rev. 261 (2003). The distinction between fair and unfair trade is questionable. Any econo-
mist will explain why dumping, as it is defined by the WTO (which permits the artificial 
reconstruction of cost of production and provides wiggling room to find dumping for many imports, 
if one looks and calculates hard enough), is most often not unfair. 
 239. See William J. Davey, The WTO Dispute Settlement System: The First Decade, Paper 
presented at the World Trade Forum (June 4–5, 2004) (on file with the author) (criticizing the Ap-
pellate Body’s record on safeguards); Sykes, supra note 238. 
 240. See Claude Barfield, High-Tech Protectionism: The Irrationality of Anti-
dumping Laws 11 (2003) (“This process [of establishing whether there is dumping] is essentially 
pro forma: Between 1980 and 1997, the [U.S. Commerce] department ruled that dumping was tak-
ing place in 96 percent of the cases it reviewed.”). 
 241. See Joost Pauwelyn, A Comparative Analysis of Trade Remedies in the WTO, in Safe-
guards under the WTO Agreement: Issues and Proposals for a More Effective 
Mechanism 21 (Araki Ichiro & Kawase Tsuyoshi eds., 2004). 
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on harm to competing producers. They share one common feature: the rein-
troduction of trade restrictions is permitted only when producer welfare has 
been, or threatens to be, negatively affected either as a result of cheap im-
ports, subsidies to foreign producers, or increased imports—which trigger, 
respectively, antidumping duties, countervailing duties, and safeguards. 
Harm to consumers or considerations of consumer welfare play no role 
whatsoever. First, before raising trade barriers against cheaper imports, 
countries currently must not consider the harm they thereby cause to con-
sumers. Second, no escape clause or safety valve exists to reintroduce trade 
restrictions based on consumer concerns or so-called collective preferences 
of citizens on nontrade issues ranging from the death penalty and cultural 
preferences to GMOs and welfare state interventions.242 Even when democ-
ratically expressed as a majority opinion, such consumer concerns can only 
be taken into account under the limited list of substantive exceptions, such 
as GATT Article XX. The exclusive focus of WTO contingency measures on 
producer welfare confirms the system’s exporter/producer-driven nature. As 
pointed out earlier, if the WTO is to survive as a legitimate institution, it 
must expand its base of supporters beyond exporters/producers and include 
consumers and citizens at large, who are, after all, the main beneficiaries of 
liberalized trade. Much as safety valves were needed to attract and maintain 
producer support in the form of safeguards and antidumping and counter-
vailing duties in the original GATT, a WTO genuinely transformed into a 
consumer-driven organization must have clear and sufficient safety valves to 
attract and maintain consumer support.243 
Finally, although the exit-voice balance for each individual WTO mem-
ber may be different, depending in particular on its relative power and 
internal political system, given that the possibility and comfort of exit op-
tions is so important in the WTO structure, it must be guaranteed for all 
WTO members, including developing countries. The major concern for de-
veloping countries in the WTO simply is not, as many perceive it today, how 
developing countries will succeed in pushing their complaints against rich 
developed nations.244 Rather, the big question will be how developing  
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countries can take equal advantage as defendants of the escape clauses and 
other exit options just described, especially against rich nations. Few of 
those options245 include differential treatment for developing countries. 
Thought should be given to whether and how such differential rules could 
be included without making escape clauses too easy an option for develop-
ing countries. After all, in most cases, trade rules are also beneficial for the 
country reducing trade barriers. The costly and complex procedures for the 
imposition of safeguards could, for example, be simplified when pursued by 
developing countries; waivers for developing countries could be granted by 
a lower majority and extended for longer periods; the compensation that 
developing countries should pay under tariff or GATS re-negotiations or 
when settling a dispute as a defendant could be lowered, as could the level 
of suspensions in response to breach by developing countries. With develop-
ing countries committing themselves to ever more WTO rules, the 
importance of flexibility and limited exit options for those countries—and 
for the sustainability and legitimacy of the world trade system as a whole—
will only increase. 
Conclusion 
This Article challenges a number of common perceptions about the 
world trade system. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the system did not 
evolve from trade politics to trade law. Rather, both the level of law and the 
level of politics gradually increased. More politics and participation, in par-
ticular consensus decisionmaking, enabled more law and discipline, 
including the legalization of GATT’s dispute process. Conversely, more law 
and discipline, in particular the WTO’s smooth and automatic enforcement 
mechanism, required more politics and participation, including a vigorous 
defense by countries of the consensus rule. More than the traditional from-
politics-to-law story, this interactive narrative between politics and law, par-
ticipation and discipline, voice and exit, better explains why, for example, 
decisionmaking evolved from majority voting to consensus, and why en-
forcement evolved from a diplomatic system to a quasi-judicial one. The 
alternative narrative demonstrates further that increased legalization in the 
form of more supervision by the WTO must not come at the expense of less 
politics in the form of less input from member countries. Rather, more dis-
cipline and law requires and leads to higher levels of participation and 
contestation: more politics. Moreover, through this lens, the current combi-
nation of a highly efficient dispute settlement system and a consensus-
based, inefficient rulemaking process no longer strikes one as a paradox. 
                                                                                                                      
country against a developed country remains unimplemented. Almost all of the problems with non-
compliance were disputes between the E.C. and the U.S. 
 245. There are certain substantive exceptions and safeguards that cannot be applied against 
certain developing countries. WTO Agreement, supra note 3, Agreement on Safeguards, Annex 1A 
art. 9.1, 1869 U.N.T.S. 154. 
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Instead, it is seen as a logical—although not necessarily optimal—balance 
between high discipline or law and high participation or politics. 
In prescriptive terms, this Article portrays a fortress WTO or a regime 
that currently lacks both input and output legitimacy. Given the prevail-
ing schools of thought, the risk of a fortress WTO—over-legalized, 
depoliticized, and forcing a uniform, regulatory straitjacket upon coun-
tries and their peoples—is, indeed, looming. To avoid this threat, the 
Article rejects the most common proposals for WTO reform. First, re-
placing the consensus rule with majority-based decisionmaking (the 
insider, institutionalist perspective); further legalizing the system with 
less exit options and a stronger dispute process (the legalist view); or a 
stricter separation of WTO affairs from domestic politics (advocated by 
both the utilitarian and the constitutional/human rights schools), may 
each make the system more efficient in the short term. When imple-
mented in isolation, however, these reforms would undermine the 
support and legitimacy of the world trade system: efficiency without loy-
alty. Second, reintroducing political vetoes in the dispute process as in 
the conservative, sovereigntist perspective or subjecting the system to 
full control by representative politics as advocated by left-leaning cos-
mopolitans are reforms that may increase the short-term support for, and 
legitimacy of, the WTO. Yet they would quickly render the system inef-
fective and dramatically reduce gains from trade: loyalty without 
efficiency. As an alternative to these two strands of proposals, which fo-
cus exclusively on one side of the law-and-politics spectrum and, quite 
surprisingly, lump together unlikely allies such as utilitarians and human 
rights scholars, sovereigntists and cosmopolitans, this Article suggests a 
more balanced reform package that tackles both sides of the spectrum. 
First, the WTO needs more, not less, politics; it needs participation and 
contestation, from both state and nonstate actors, both in and outside the 
WTO. Second, the system must maintain and clarify, not eliminate, cer-
tain escape clauses and exit options, especially those tailored to 
consumer welfare, and make them viable also for weak countries. With 
the right balance between flexibility and precommitment, politics and 
law, participation and discipline, the world trade system can combine 
efficiency and legitimacy; that is, it can reap the gains from trade and 
enjoy broad-based support. 
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